The economics of research and development : how research and development capital affects production and markets and is affected by tax incentives by Shah, Anwar & DEC
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1325
The Economics  of Research  Asurvyandsynthesisofthe
theoretical and empirical
and Development  literature on the economics of
research and development
How Research and Development
Capital Affects Production
and Markets and Is Affected
by Tax  Incentives
Anwar Shah
The World Bank
Polic-y  Rcsearch  Departnent

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1325
Summary findigs
Certin  themes and findings  emerge from Shah's analysis  Tle  information asymmetry  between an R&D
of key relationships between  research and development  perforner  and a financier  distinguishes  R&D investment
(R&D) and other factors. Among  them,  from traditional riskyr  investment.  It is in the interest of
the R&D performer to keep vital project information
R&D capital  d the stcnture of production  secret But in the absence  of detailed information, project
* R&D capital facilitates  the mapping of technological  financing  may not be forthcoming.  Asymmetric
possibilities  into economic opportunities.  information also limits the R&D firm's ability to profit
* R&D takes time to accumulate  and uses up scarce  from its output.
resources.  The adjustrnent  process from project initiation  Succss breeds success.  Since  learning involves  costs,
to product and process  development typically  takes three  successful  firms possess  an advantage  over their rivals in
to five years.  enjoying  greater possibilities  for success So, monopoly
* The marginal adjustment costs for R&D arc higher  persists in the R&D capital markeL Past successe from
than for plant and equipment.  R8cD investments  lead to greater current R&D efforts by
e  R&D capital is a complement to physical  capital but  successful  finrs  These firms tend thereby to produce
is a substitute for labor in the long run.  further innovations and thus widen the gap between
* Output changes exert a much stronger influence on  themselves  and their rivals.
R&D capital than vice versa  Much R&D capital is concentraced  in large firms, but
it is more licely that they have become large because  of
R-&D  capital  and maket stnuwe  their R&D successes  than that they do more and more
The value of cost-reducing  R&D is determined by its  fruitful R&D because  they are large.
profitability. Since private returns from R&D understate
true social returns from such investments, R&D will be  Pusblic  policy and  R&SD  invesment
underprovided. And since R&D investments  often  *  Most industrial  nations see the need to intervene
represent large fixed costs,  market structure in R&8D  through the tax code to encourage R&D activities.
intensive  industries is going to be concentrated. This  Empirical  evidence on the effectiveness  of such initatives
situation is, however, not unique to R&D. What is  is limited.
unique about R&D is the nature of spillovers These  * An analysis  of parameter estimates for a cost
spillovers  reduce industry costs, but since they result in  function of the Canadian industries  suggests  that R&D
inappropriability  of returns for the R&D performer,  tax credits had a significant  positive  impact on R&D
incentives  to do R&D arc reduced. Restoring  investment in Canada. For every dollar of revenue
appropriabilitry  does not help matters either because it  foregone for the national treasury, $1.80 worth of
results  in industrial concentration, incorrect pricing of  additional R&D investment was undertaken. This
R&D, and higher social  costs. Perfect appropriability  suggests  that properly designed  tax incentives  can fiuther
may also result in excessive  R&D because  too many  public  policy objectives  cost-effectively.
firms may be fishing  for the same information.
This paper  - a product of the Public  Economics  Division,  Policy  Rcscarch  Department  - is part of a series  of papers  prepared
for the research  project  "An  Evaluation  of  Tax Incentves  for  Industrial  and Technological  Development"  (RPO  675-10),  that was
funded  by  the Bank's  Research  Support  Budget.  Copies  of this  paper arc available  frec  from the World  Bank,  1818 H Stree NW,
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Carlina  Jones,  room N10-063,  extension  37699 (85 pages).  July 1994.
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by Anwar  Shah
This paper  provides  a selective  survey  and synthesis  of the theoretical  and empirical  literature
on the economics  of research  and development.
In the following,  main  themes  emerging  from an analysis  of R&D and production  structure,
R&D and product market structure, rationale  for public intervention  for R&D investment  and the
effectiveness  of tax polcies for R&D investment  are presented.
R&D CapitaD  and the Stntdure  of Production
R&D capital, as an input, includes  scientific  and engineering  personnel, laboratories  and
equipment  and related  input. R&D capital  serves  as an input  in a joint production  of multiple  outputs
which include  product  and process  development.  R&D capital  facilitates  the mapping  of teoological
possibilities  into economic  opportunities.
R&D taesW  time  to accumulate  and uses  up scar  resources. It may take several  year for a
project  td proceed  from proposal  to development  stage. R&D  capital  accumulation  serves  to create  new
knowledge  relating  to  new production  techniques. Thus it ensures  that the process  of technical  change
is evolutionary  and cumulative  in chamcter. Technological  changer  widens  production  opportunities  for
the economy  by enablig it to obtai  greater outputs  with given inputs  or the substitution  of relatively
cheaper  inputs  for reatively more  expensive  ones.
A specla feature  of R&D capital  is the imperfect  appropriability  of res  as a result of inran-
as well as inter-industry  capital  spillovers. Spillovers  diffuse  knowledge  by channels  such as patents,
iL.-  ;  -='
cross-licefsing  ageements,  R&D personnel  mobility  and inputs  purchases.  The overall  impact  of R&D
capital  spillovers  on the incentives  to undertake  additional  R&D investment  is unclear al view of two
opposing  influences. Firt,  the imperfect  appropriability  of returns  from own R&D has a disincentive
effect  Second,  the desire  to tap into the external  knowledge  an associated  benefits  promotes  incentives
to undertake  own  R&D to develop  an intemal  capability  to benefit  from extemally  generated  knowledge.
The net impact  of the above  varies  by industry  and explains  the paradox  posed  by some  R&D  intensive
industries  such.  as electronics  and  chemicals  where  the high levels  of spillovers  do not seem  to have  any
detrimental  effects  on the incentives  to undertake  additional  R&D investment.
- The following  broad conclusions  emerge from a survey  of the available  empirical  evidence
relating  R&D capital  and the Structure  of production.
*  -.The overall adjustment  process from R&D project initiation  to  product and process
development  takes  three  to five years.
- The marginal  adjustment  costs  for R&D are higher  than  those  for plant and equipment.
*  The own  price elasticity  of demand  for R&D  capital  is less  than  unity  regardless  of the time
-.  . perod considered.
- R&D capital  is a complement  to physical  capital  but a substitute  for labor in the long ruL
*  the  long run output elasticity  of demand  for R&D capital  is close  to unity.  Short run
elasticities  are much  smaller  than  those  for the long  run.
*  U.S. subsidiaries  in Canada and Canadian-ontrolled  private corporations  show  similar
response  in the long  rmn  but  the short  run impact  of output  changes  on R&D capital  is more
pronounced  for the latter.
v  Output  changes  exert  a much-  stronger  influence  on R&D capital  than  vice versa.
*  -The  contribution  of R&D  capital  to the productivity  growth  is inconclusive  but more  recent
work confirms  U.S. findings  of a positive  and significant  relationship.
iiW-X-
*  R&D capita spillovers  are large  and  significant  and as a-result  the social  rate  of returns  on
R&D projects  exceeds  the private  returns  by at least two-thirds  of the private return in
Canada.
R&D Cail  d Produd Mare  Strucure
The value  of cost reducing  R&D  is determined  by its profitability.  Since  private  returns  from
R&D understate  true social  reurns from such investments,  R&D will be underprovided.  Furthermore,
since R&D investments  often represent  large fixed  costs, market  structure  in R&D intensive  industies
is going  to be concentrad.  The above  situ'tion  is, however,  not unique  to R&D.  What  is unique  about
the R&D is the nature of spillovers. These spillovers  reduce industry  costs but since they result in
inappropriability  of returns for the R&D performer, incentives  to do R&D are reduced. Restoring
a;ppropriabilitydoes  not help  matters  either  because  it results  in industrial  concentration,  incorrect  pricing
of R&D  and  resulting  social  costs. Perfect  appropriability  may  also  result  in excessive  R&D  because  too
many  fims may  be fishing  for the same  information.
The information  asymmetry  between  a R&D performer and a financier  distinguishes  R&D
investment  from traditional  risky investment. It is in the interest  of the R& D performer  to keep  vital
project information  secret but in the absence  of detailed  information,  project financing  may not be
forthcoming.  Asymmetric  information  also  limits  the R&D firm's ability  to profit from  -its  output.
The following  broad  conclusions  emerge  from  a survey  of empirical  evidence  on  the relationship
between  R&D capital  and market  structure.
*  Success  breeds success.  Since learning  involves costs, successful  firms possess and
advantage  over their rivals in enjoying  greater possibilities  for further success.  Thus
monopoly  persists  in the R&D  capital  market. Past successes  of R&D investments  lead  to
greater  current  R&D effort  son  the part of the successful  firms. These-firms,  thereby,  tend
to produce  firiher innovations  and  thus  widen  the gap between  themselves  and  their rivals.
iii*  m  - *  The relationship  between  R&D and firm size is much looser  and obscure  ta  is implied
by the usual  rtatements  of Schumpeterian  hypothesis.  While much of the R&D capital  is
concentrated  in large firms, it is more  likely  that they  have become  large because  of their
R&D successes  rather than that they do more and more friitfib R&D because  they are
large.
R&D capital  and industrial  concentration  are positively  correlated  upto  moderate  levels  of
industrial  concentraton.
*  Itra-industry spillovers  drive a wedge  between  the social and the private return in an
industry  as well  as between  the social  rates  across  industries. Social  rates  of return  diverge
from the private rates  by 50 to 150  percent  depending  upon the R&D intensiveness  of the
industry.
*  I  the presence  of spillovers,  the society's  demand  for R&D capital  at the existing  market
rates of return significantly  exceeds  the private  demand.
Public Policy  and R&D Investment
t has been  argued  that  social rate of return  from R&D is higher  than the private  rate of return
due either  to the presence  of spillovers  or inforation asymmetries.  Due  to the presence  of spiliover,  the
R&D performer  is not able to fully appropriate  benefits  associated  with his activity. the presence  of
asymmetc information  between  R&D  performer  and  fmancier  limits  financing  of R&D  projects.  Project
success  warrants  secrecy  but project  financing  requires  release  of vital information. As a result many
projects  lapse, lacking  financing. The asymmetric  information  in the R&iD  output  market  also limits  the
R&D firm's ability  to achieve  licensing  gains  from trade.
Most industi  nations see the need to intervene through the tax code to  encourage R&D
activities.  Empirical  evidence  on the effectiveness  of such initiatives  is quite limited.  This study
examined  the impact  of Canadian  R&D tax credits  on R&D investment  using a production  structure
ivframework. The framework  enables  a researcher  to trace the impact  of tax policies  and production  and
investmen  decisions  of an industry. An implementation  of this framework  was carried  out by wsing
detailed  data  on iniputs  and  outputs  and  factor  and  output  prices  and tax  regime  for 18 Canadian  industries
for the period 1963  to 1933. Provisions  in the tax code  were used  wo  develop  estimates  for the user cost
of capital. A system  of simultaneous  equations  incorporating  the cost function  and derived  input  demand
functions  was estimated  using non-linear  interactive  methods in tranlog form.  The estimated  cast
functon fitted  the data  well and  also  was "well-behave".  An analysis  of parameter  estimates  for this cost
function  suggests  that R&D tax credit  had a significant  positive  impact  on R&D investment  in Canada
and for every dollar of revenue  foregone  for the national  treasury  $1.80 worth of additional  R&D
investment  was undertaken. This suggests  that properly  designed  tax incentive  can further  public  policy
objectives  in a cost-effective  manner.
V  -IN  XODUCTION
This paper  provides  a selective  survey  and synthesis  of the theoretical  and empirical  literatuire  on
the economics  of research  and development.  This paper is organized  into various  sections  as follows.
Section  1  provides  an overview  of the  theoretical  underpinnings  of the  relationship  between  R&D
capital  and the structur of production  and summarizes  empirical  evidence  on the hypothesis  presented
in the theoretica literature. It highlights  the special  nature  of the R&D  capital  as a factor  of production.
The nature of Lags  in R&D capital  accumulation,  adjustment  process,  relationship  of R&D capital  with
*other  factors  of production,  rate of technological  progress  and  output  are surveyed. It fur-ther  discuses
the nature  of R&D capital  spillovers,  the channels  for their transmission,  their impact  on incentives  to
undertake  R&D and possible  mechanisms  to internalize  these externalities.
Section  2 deals with contemporaneous  relationship  between  R&D capital and product market
structure. Tfhe  focus is on the following  types  of issues. What is the relationship  between  R&D capital,
firm size, stock  market  value of the firm, product  demand  and  the nature  of competition?  What are the
effects  of R&D spillovers  on the industry  performance?  What is the impadt  of asymmetric  information
on R&D project  financing  as well as on the R&D  firm's ability  to profit from its output?
Section  3 outlines  the case for government  intervention  in the R&D capital  market, provides
critical  comments,  indicates  instruments  of government  support  for R&D investment  and  briefs on the
Government  of Canada  current  initiatives  for technology  development.  It also provides  an overview  of
tax incentives  for R&D  in major industrial  societies.  The imnpact  of tax  policy  on the cost  of R&D capital
is reviewed in the next section.  The following  section provides  a survey of the broad empirical-2-
approachas  to evaluate  the effectiveness  of government  tax incentives  for R&D  investment.  The rationale
and liuttations  of each approach  are presented. The section  concludes  with a description  of the overall
researcb  strategy  adopted  in the present  study.
Secton 4 outlines  the empirical  approach  and discusses  the econometric  results  and draws  some
conclusions regarding the effectiveness  of tax measures in promoting R&D investment  in Canada.
The final  section  (Section  5) provides  a summary  of the entire study.
Three appendices  to the study  are provided. Appendix  A provides  a description  and  lists sources
of data used in this study. Several  procedures  used  in constructing  various  serious  are also documented.
Two additional  appendices  provide  details  of the direct  grant  support  for R&D  investment  in Canada  and
the definition  of the R&D capital  adopted  in the Canadian  Income  Tax Act.3-
1.  R&D CAPITAL AND THE STRUCTURE OF FRODUCflON: THEORY AND
This section  provides  an overview  of the theoretical  underpinnings  and the empirical  evidence  on
the relationship  between  R&D capital  and die structure  of production.  ft highlights  the special  nature-  of
R&D capital  as a factr  of production. Formalizing  the role of R&D capital  in the production  process
raises  a number  of issues. These  issues  include:  the lags in R&D  capital  acmlto;the  effect  of R&D
capital  on piroductivity  growth,  input  proportions  and output  expansion;  and the impact  of R&D capital
spilovers  on incentives  to undertake  own  R&D investment.  These  isues are discussed  and  the empirical
evidence  is summarized  in the following  subsections.  The final section  draws some  overall  conclusions
from the discu-ssion  presented  in this section  on the role of R&D capital  in the production  structure.
R&D Capita Factor Substhituon wand  Adjustnent
R&D projects  create new knowledge  as a result of accumulated  expenditures  over time.  The
cumulative  results  of all R&D  projects  constitute  our stock  of knowledge  or the stock  of R&D capital.'
Since R&D capital  plays a fundamental  role in promoting  productivity  growth  and output  expansion  in
any economy, it is important  to have as accurate a measure  of such a capital as possible.  R&D
expenditures  are usually  considered  a convenient  measure  of R&D  capital. Nominal  R&D expenditures
are, however,  an imperfect  guide  because  they  incorporate  die  impact  of price inflation  and  do not  reveal
tmue  changes  in R&D  activity  levels. Furthermore,  R&D  expenditures  relate  to current  year  projecb.  but
knowledge  capital  at any point in time is a result of the accunmulated  expenditures  from past projects.
An appropriate  deflator  must therefore  be used to derive  real R&D expenditure.  Bernstein  (19  86c)
faulted  the gross  national  expenditure  (GNE)  imrplicit  price index  and the consumer  price index  (CPI)  as
deftors  for R&D expenditures  and stresed the need for developing  a specific  R&D deflator!' He4-
argued  that  there was a time  varying  bias associated  with deflating  R&D expenditures  by the GNE  or the
CPI deflators  because  these deflators  reflected  changes  in output  prices while  R&D expenditures  related
to inputs  in the production  process.
R&D investment  projects,  if successful,  result  in new  products  and processes. But there may  be
several  lags  between  the time initial  investment  is undertaken  and when  product  and  process  development
is accomplished.  Research  and development  takes time and it may  take several years for a project  to
proceed  from proposal  to development  stage. Process  innovations  typically  are introduced  gradually  and
product  innovations  require  time for advertising  straegy to command  consumer  acceptance. In general
for any industry  there may be a large number  of projects  that came  on stream  at different  time periods,
currently are in varying stages of implementation  and likely to be completed  at a sequence  of time
periods.  R&D capital represents  an aggregation  and accunmlation  of these projects.  The overall
adjustment  process  could  take several  years. The transformation  of R&D expenditures  into R&D  capital
is affected  by the speed  with which  new ideas  are translated  into product  and process  development  and
at the  rate this knowledge  is acquired  by rivals  in the industry. Nelson  (1982)  argues  tiat an R&D  capital
accumulation  process  is cosdy  and  time consuming.  One  learns  about  efficacious  R&D projects  through
one's successes  and failures. The successes  and failures  guide  one's future  search efforts. One round
of technological  advance  lays the foundation  for the next round. The process  of technical  advancement
is cumulative  but translation  of results  into  processes  and  products  is subject  to lags.
The availale empirical  evidence  suggests  that the overall  adjustment  process  from R&D  project
initation to product  and process  development  often  takes several  years. Nadiri (1980)  and Nadiri and
Bitros  (1980)  estimate  the itervening period  tO be three to five years  duration  and Bernstein  and Nadiri
(1984)  found it to be even  longer and of four to eight years  duration. Ravenscraft  and Scherer  (1982)
estimated  a mean  lag of R&D on net pre-tax  profits  for U.S businesses  to range  from four to six years.-5-
Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha (1986) obtained a mean lag in the adjustment  of R&D of five years for the
U.S.,  eight years in Japan and ten years in Germany.
The available empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that adjustment  costs for R&D capital
exceed those for physical capital.  For the United States, Bernstein and Nadiri (1985) estimated that
marginal adjustment  costs for R&D exceed  those for plant and equipment. They fiurther  observe that this
difference was more pronounced in industries that exhibit higher propensities to spend on R&D.  For
Canada, Berstein  (1985a) estimated that the marginal adjustment  costs for R&D were higher than those
for plant and equipment. Griliches (1979) estimates  that the short-term nature of commercial  research
and development  (see Mansfield  and others in Williams (1973, pp. 87-90)  serves to make the development
lag peak between  three to five years and rapidly decline afterwards  with most of the original R&D output
becoming public knowledge in about ten years.
R&D Capia  Output Expansion and Productivity Growth
R&D capital combines with traditional inputs in production to facilitate output expansion by
reducing the cost per unit of outp=.  Changes in the level of R&D capital change factor intensities by
allowing substituion out of relatively scarce factors.  This serves to decrease cost of production.  The
demand for R&D capital as an input in the production process in influenced  by relative factor prices and
output quantities. A number of empirical studies have examined  the influences of changes in the prices
of conventional inputs on the demand for R&D capital  The results from a few selected studies are
presented in the following paragraphs.
Most of the studies found that the demand for R&D capit  was price inelastic i.e. a one percent
increase in its own price led to less than one percent decrease in quantity demanded.  Furthermore, the
long run own price elasticity of demand for knowledge  capital was found to be higher than the short run
estimate.  Nadiri (1980) developed estimates of rental rates for R&D capital for U.S. manu1acturing6 -
industries. He observed  that a one percent  increase  in this  rental  rate caused  a 0.6 percent  decline  in the
demand  for R&D capital. Bernstein  and Nadiri (1986a)  estimated  own price elasticity  of demand  for
lkowledge  capital  to be -0.45. Bernstein  (1984a)  estimated  long rmn  own  price elasticity  of demand  for
R&D  capital  to be -0.35. The short  run elasticity  was about  one third  of this estimate. Bernstein  (1984a)
examind  the factor price effects for  Canadian controlled  private corporations  as  well as U.S.
subsidiaries. He estimated  long run own price elasticities  of demand  for R&D capital  for the two
subsamples  as -0.28 and -0.42 respectively. The short run elasticities  were nearly half of the above
estimates. Mobnen,  Nadiri  and  Pmcha  (1986)  found  the own  price  elasticity  of R&D  capital  for the  U.S.
manufacturing  industries  to  be -0.04, -0.06 and -0.15 in  the short, intermediate  and long runs
respectively_
ihe empirical  evidence  suggests  that physical  and  R&D capital  are complements  in relation  to
each other  but substute for labor in the long  run. The short run evidence  is mixed. Rasmussen  (1973)
found that the demand  for R&D capital  was sensitive  to changes  in the prces of labor and physical
capital.  Schwartz  (1983) studied  the relationship  between R&D capital and three other factors of
production  namely  labor, physical  capital  and energy  for fourteen  manufacturing  industries  in Canada.
His results  suggest  that exogenous  changes  in R&D  capital  lead to increased  requirements  for all three
remaining  factors  of production  studied. Bernstein  and Nadiri (1984)  found  physical  and R&D capital
to be complements.  The demand  for R&D capital  on average  declined  by 0.2 percent  for one  percentage
point increase  in the rental  rate on physical  capital. The labor and  R&D capital  on the other  hand were
substittes.  A one percentage  point increase  in the rental rate of R&D capital  in the long run  resulted
in a decline  of 0.25  percent  in labor demand.  Bernstein  (1984a)  found  confirmation  of the  U.S. evidence
on the conplemenrty  between  R&D and  physical  capital  and substitutability  between  R&D capital  and
labor inputs. In the long run one percentage  point decrease  in the rental rate for R&D capital  resulted
in an increase  of abt  0.05 percent in the demand  for physical  capital  but a decrease  of about 0.40-7-
percent in the demand  for labor. In the short run, the same  estimates  were 0.01  and 0.25 respectively.
Thbis  study  showed  that  R&D  and  physical  capital  inputs  were  complementary  to each  other  but  substitutes
for labor  both in the short and the long  run. Mohnen  et al. (1986)  estimated  that  labor and R&D  capital
were substitutes,  whereas  labor and capital  were complements  in Japan and in Germany  but substitutes
in the U.S. Capital  and R&D capital were complements  in the U.S. and in Japan and substitutes  in
Germany.
R&D Output  wad Output  Erpansion
Output  expansion  has been  considered  an important  determiinant  of the demand  for R&D  capital
in much  of the empirical  work. For example,  Nadiri  and  Bitros  (1980)  for a sample  of firms  in five U.S.
industries  observed  tha, on the average,  a one percent  increase  in output  generated  a 0.7 percent  increase
in R&D capital. This figure was smaller  for the subsamnple  of large firms  only. Bernstein  and Nadiri
(1984)  for four U.S. industries  found the Long  run output elasticity  of demand  for R&D capital  to be
greater  than  unity.  For Canada  based  on a sample  of major  R&D  performing  fims, Bernstein  (1984a)
found  this  elasticity  to equal  unity. The short  run estimate  for this  measure  was about  one-quarter  of chat
for the long run.  Bernstein  (19  84)  concluded  that the short run output elasticity  was higher for
Canadian-controlled  private  corporations  than for U.S. subsidiaries  in Canada  but the long run elasticity
was mnvariant  to the control  or ownership  of the firmis.  Bernstein  (1985a)  estimated  the output  elasticities
of demand  for R&D capital  to equal 1 and 0.2 in the long and the short runs respectively. Mohnen  et
al. (1986)  for the U-S.  auatrn  industries  estimated  short, intermediate,  and long run output
elasticity  of demand  for R&D capital  to be 0.16, 0.31 and 1.00 respectively. Thus we conclude  that
while  in the short run the output  expansion  induces  a less  than  proportionate  increase  in demand  for R&D
capital,  in the long run, it leads  to almost  one to one increase  in the demand  for R&D capital.tr.  C>"
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R&D capital is generally shown  to have a positive impact  on output. Mansfield (1968), Minasian
(1969) and Grlliches (1973) estimated that on the average for U.S. manufacturing and other industries,
a one percent increase in R&D capital led to a 0.1 percent increase in output.  An early Canadian study
on the subject by Globerman (1972) did not find any significant effect of R&D capital on output but a
recent study by Switzer (1984) found results similar to the U.S. studies.
Quite a large number of studies have empirically investigated the reiationship between R&D
capital and productivity  growth. Summary  results of a few selected studies are presented in the following
paragraphs.
R&D Caia  ad  Totl  Fador Prductivity  Growth
Mansfield (1965,  1968) found that the rate of technological change is direcdy  related to the
growth rate of R&D capital.  This result is invariant to the nature of technological change.  For ten
chemical and petroleum firms he found that 20 percent of the productivity  growth could be attributed to
growth in R&D capital when the technical change was disembodied. With a capital embodied technical
change, the growth in R&D capital explains nearly 70 percent of the total factor productivity growth.
Griliches (1964) found that the R&D capital contributed  to about 30% of total factor productivity
growth in agriculture.  In a subsequent study of U.S.  manufacturing at two, three and four digit SIC
level, R&D growth explained about 40% of the total factor productivity growth.
Terleckyj (1974, 1975, 1977, 1980) considered both the direct and indirect effects of R&D for
twenty U.S. manufacuring industries. He defined direct effects as those arising from intraindustry R&D
investment  and indirect effects as those associated with interindustry transactions.  His analysis credited
privately financed R&D  capital for 30% growth in total  factor productivity.  The indirect effects
associated with privately financed R&D were found to account for nearly 78 percent of total productivity- -
grot-h.  The government  financed  R&D did not show any significant  direct or indirect  effects on
productivity growth.
Griliches  (1980a)  related  total factor  productivity  growth  measures  for 883  large  U.S. companies
during  the 1957-1965  period  to various  measures  of the growth  in R&D capital  and found  a sizeable  and
signi;cant positive effect of R&D on productivity  growth.  He obtained  an elasticity  of output with
respect  to R&D investments  of about  0.07 and an implied  average  gross excess  return of 27 percent (as
of  1963),  a significantly  lower rate of return to federally financed  R&D expenditures,  and no clear
evidence  of scale effects either in R&D investment  policies or the returns from it.  The positive
contribution  of R&D to total factor  productivity  growth  was also confirmed  by Griliches  (1980b).
Manfild  (1980)  based  on a sample  of 20 U.S. manufacturing  industries  for 1948-66  and 16  U.S.
petroleunm  and chemical  fims during 196D-76  found that the growth  rate of both the basic and applied
privately financed  R&D capital  had a positive and significant  influence  on total factor productivity
growth. For government  financed  R&D  he found support  for the Terleckyj  results  that it did not have
any significant  impact  on productivity  growth. He found  a significant  premium  on basic research,  on the
order of 2 to 1 at the industry level and 16 to 1 at the firm  level.  Link (1981) also found similar results
for 1973-78  based  on data for 55 U.S. firms.
Nadiri  and  Schankerman  (1981)  decomposed  total  factor  productivity  growth  into  four  components
namely  factor  price effect,  product  demand  effect,  R&D effect  and autonomous  technical  change  effect.
This decomposition  was carried  out for U.S. manufacturing  at total, durable  and non-durable  levels of
aggregation  for four subperiods  in the interval  1958 to 1978. They found that R&D and exogenous
technical  change  ('the technology  effect') dominated  productivity  growth in the earlier years and the
factor price and  product  demand  (the 'scale effect")  were the prime motivators  for productivity  growth
in later years  of the period studied.X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i  -
Jaffe (1988),  instead,  suggests  to decompose  the  Total  Factor  Productivity  (1FF) growth  into  the
following  three factors:  technological  opportunities,  market demand  and R&D spillovers.  Using data
compiled  at NBER  relative to 573 firms during 1965-77,  the author concludes  all the three effecs
together  have an impact  on R&D demand.  At the same time, in explaining  TFP growth  Jaffe (1988)
cannot  separate  the effects  of technological  changes  and demand.  More robust  is the result relative  to
R&D  spillovers:  ir the innovation  process,  the R&D  spillovers  show  a positive  externality  on neighbor
firms' level of R&D investment  and costs.
Scherer  (1982)  found that both the intraindustry  and interindustry  effects  of R&D capital  on
productivity  growth during 1945-65  were strong  but appear  to have weakened  during  the 1970s. He
further  found interindustry  effects  of R&D  capital  to be much  stronger  than the intraindustry  effects.
Scherer (1983)  concluded  that 0.20 to 0.28 percent decline  in productivity  in 1978 could be
attributed  to lower level  of R&D.
Levy and Terleckyj  (1983)  estimated  a large impact  of private  sector R&D capital  on private
sector productivity,  with elasticity  of about  0.28.  Comparable  elasticity  estimates  for the government
contract R&D was 0.065.  No significant  effect of all other government  R&D on private sector
productivity  was found. These  findings  for government  contract  R&D  were consistent  wvith  Levin (1980)
and Scott  (1984)  indicating  small  but significant  stimulative  effects  of government  support  for R&D.
Griliches  and Mairesse  (1984)  for 100  large U.S. firms for the period 1966-77  found that the
contribution  of R&D  capital  to productivity  growth  was  higher  than that of physical  capital.
Clark and Griliches  (1984)  found  a statistically  significant  relationship  between  R&D intensity
and the growth  in total factor  productivity,  implying  a gross excess  rate of return  to R&D of about  20
percent. This return  is  bigger  for process  R&D  than  for product  R&D. These  returns  however,  crucially
depend  on the presence  of previous  major technological  changes  in the respective  industries,  implying
a major role for spillovers  from the previous  R&D efforts  of other  firms  and industries.- 11  -
Griliches  and Lichtenberg  (1984)  for U.S. manufacturing  industries  at two and three digit SIC
level  found  that the statistical  relationship  between  productivity  growth  and  R&D intensity  grew  stronger
in the 1970s.
Lichtenberg  (1984)  found  a negative  and statistically  significant  relationship  between  government
contract  R&D and private  sector  productivity  growth.
Baly and Chaicrabarti  (1985)  on the basis of case  studies  of chemicals  and textiles  industries  in
the U.S. found a positive relation  between  innovation  and productivity  patterns. They attributed  the
slowdown  in the U.S. manufactring industries  in the seventies  partly to a slowdown  in innovation.
Griliches  (1986 used a sample of 911 large (1000 or more employees)  U.S. manufacturing
companies  performing  R&D during 1966-77  and reported three major findings:  R&D contributed
positively  to productivity  growth and seemed to have earned a relatively  high rate of return; basic
research appeared  to be more important  as a productivity  deterninant  than other types of R&D; and
privately  financed  R&D expenditures  were more effective,  at the firm level, than federally  financed
ones.4
Two  earlier Canadian  studies  on the subject  did  not support  U.S. findings. Lithwick  did not  find
any  significant  relation  between  productivity  growth  and  industry  R&D expenditures.  Globerman  (1972)
estimated  a negative  and  statisdcally  significant  relationship  between  R&D capital  and  overall  productivity
growth.
A recent  study by Switzer  (1984)  of fourteen industries  attributed  nearly  60 percent  growth  in
factor  productivity  to the growth  in R&D capital. Switzer  fiuther found  that government  financed  R&D
had no significant  impact  on producdvity  growth. Switzer  results  however,  must  be considered  tentative
as he did not test whether  the value-added  or total output  (output  inclusive  of intermediate  inputs)  is the
appropriate  output measure.  He also treated R&D capital and conventional  factors of production
asymmetrically.  Profit maximization  framework  was used  for the latter  only.An anavlyss  of the fimpact  of R&D on TFP growth  in Japan is presented  by Goto and Suzuki
(1989). Moving away from the previous  research,  that used data based on financial  statements,  the
authors construct and utilize data based on R&D expenditure.  The empirical  findings  support the
hypothesis  that productivity  growth  of a firm is stimuilated  by other industries'  R&D.
Robert  Solow  (1957)  suggested  that  only 10%  of the rise in US  per capita  output  during  the years
1909-1949  was due to growth  in the capital/labor  ratio. To explain  the remainder  of the increase,
the more efficient  use of inputs  or the presence  of technological  changes  needed  to be considered.
Over the past few decades, many researchers  have explored  the determinants  of the latter
s.sggested  two explanations.  In particular,  R&D investment  is generally  regarded  as having  a strong
impact  on total factor  productivity  (1TFP)  growth.  Moreover,  the links  between  technological  change  and
productivity  growth is been documented  by numerous recent studies, which generally use R&D
expenditures  as an indicator  of the intensity  of technological  change.
Englander  and others  (1988)  test whether  an increase  of the R&D capital  stoc-k  translates  into an
improementin  technology  and  productivity.  Using  industry-level  data  across  countries  for the  years 1970
to.1983,  the authors  find that  part of the T7FF  deceleration  recorded  in the 1970s  may  have  been caused
by a reduction  of the.  generation  of new  technologies.  In addition,  they  highlight  the unequal  distribution
of innovation  across  sectors, which  can be considered  as one of the possible  causes for the divergent
trends in T7FP  growth and price inflation  in manufacturing  and service industries  observed in many
western  economies.
While  the strong  positive  correlation  between  R&D  investmenTt  and T7FP  growth  at the industry
level is supported  by several  empirical  studies,  the results  at the firm level  have,  been much  less  robust.
A significant  improvement  of the state of knowledge  is due to Lichtenberg  and Siegel  (1991): using
confidential  Census  longitudinal  microdata,  the two researchers  find  that a significant  eause  of the T7FP
growth  during  the years 1972-1985  is the R&D investment.  Furthermore,  it appears  that  investmnents  in- 13 -
different types of R&D has a different impact on productivity  growth: among all, only the investment  in
basic research strongly affects TFP growth. Another important finding is the strong positive correlation
between the rate of growth of TFP and privately funded R&D. On the other hand, federally-funded  R&D
cannot be considered as a significant determinant of productivity growth.
The most important conclusion that derives from this body of studies is that the R&D spending
is not responsible for the productivity slowdown of the  1970s, since it has been proved that both
aggregate R&D intensity and the (estimated) impact of R&D on productivity growth experienced no
decline during this period. On the other hand, since during the 1980's both the size and the efficacy of
R&D investment  has increased, we must take into account R&D investment to elucidate the rise in TFrP
growth in these past years.
As suggested in earlier paragraphs, capital accumulation  is stimulated by technological  changes,
and it is responsible for the increase in output per hour worked. On the other side, Romer (1990) suggests
that the technological change observed is more likely to be endogenous rather than exogenous, since it
is primarly  the consequence of rational actions taken by people in response to market incentives. This
implies that market incentives have a central role in the process of translation of new knowledge into
goods. Moreover, the good 'new knowledge", an imperfect  public good, has different features from other
economic goods, since it comports only an initial fixed cost for its use.
The most important result that derives from Romer's study is that not only the level of income
and welfare but also the rate of growth are affected by increases in the size of the market, i.e.  "larger
markets induce mnce research and faster growth" (Romer, 1990). In addition, the author suggests that
the growth rate is an increasing function of the stock of human capital, but not of the total size of the
labor force nor of the population. This result helps to explain why countries with a stock of human capital
too low may not experience any growth.- 14-
R&D  Ca  l and Labor  Purductivi
Most  studies  on the subject  found  a positive  and  significant  effect  of private  R&D  capital  on labor
productivity  growth  rate.  Griliches  (1980)  attributed  30 percent  of the growth  in labor productivity  of
six U.S. industies to R&D capital  accumulation.  Nadiri  (1980)  placed  the same  figure at 35 percent  for
the aggregate  U.S. private  sector. Canadian  results  were somewhat  mixed. Postner  and Wesa (1983)
and  Hartwick  and  Ewan (1983)  concluded  that  there was  no significant  relationship  between  growth  rate
of labor productivity  and R&D capital  accumulation  in Canada. However,  when Postner and Wesa
(1983)  considered  inter-industry  effects  they found  that the indirect  effect  of R&D investment  on labor
productivitv  was positive and significant. Longo (1984)  estimated  chat  the growth in R&D capital
accounted  for 16 to 60 percent  of labor  productivity  growth  in major  R&D performing  industries.
R&D Capi  ad  SpWiovev
A special  feature  of R&D  activities  is that a firm can augment  its R&D capital  stock  by simply
profiting  from the R&D results  of another  firm.  The knowledge  that is acquired  without  there being  a
market tansaction for it is commonly  referred to as an R&D spillover. The presence  of spillovers
suggests  that  the spillover  generating  firm cannot  completely  appropriate  the returns associated  with its
R&D capital. Thus R&D spillovers  arise  due to the inability  of the R&D performers  to exclude  others
from freely or at a lower cost obtainig the benefits  of new R&D capital.  In the presence  of these
spillovers  the R&D investor  may not be able to earn sufficient  return on investment  and thereby  the
incentive  to undertake  R&D is diminished.
Spillovers  diffusse  knowledge  by a wide variety  of channels. Foremost  of these channels  are
patents, licensing  agreements,  R&D personnel  mobility  and input  purchases. Patents enable  firms to
receive  vital information  which  could  be used to patent  around  the original  invention.  Royalty  payments
would  not  reflect  the social  value  of a patented  invention  if the ideas  of the patentee  are being  successfully-15  -
exploited  to their own  ends  by other  firms. Cross-licensing  agreements  also  serve  to transmit  spillovers.
Licensing  fees may  not  fully  reflect  the  benefit  recei"!ed  from  this knowledge  transfer  because  die initial
recipient  may  recover  fully or partially  his initial  costs  through  cross licensing. The mobility  of R&D
personnel  from one firm  to another  is potentially  a very important  source  of spillovers.  The formation
of AMDAHL  by a fbrmer  MBM  engineer  illustrates  the importance  of this mechanism  in knowledge
trAnsmission.  Input  purchases  have  also  the potential  of generating  spillovers  if the input  prices  do not
fully  reflect  die R&D  costs  of the sellers. For example,  the purchase  price  of computers  in general  do
not reflect all die cost-reducing  possibilities  open to downstream  or purchasing  firms.  The above
discussion  of spillover  transmission  covers  only some better known formal mechanisms  and omits
important  informal  processes.  For example,  the U.S.  National  Aerospace  Program  and  the Pentagon  do
not sell anything  to hospital  supplies  industries  but major  advances  in medical  technology  have  been  a
spinoff  of die R&D done  by die formner  institutions?
It was noted earlier  that the existence  of these  spillovers  leads  to imperfect  appropriability  of
retrn  to R&D capital  and acts as a disincentive  to undertake  own  R&D investment  (see also Arrow
1962). Reinganum  (1981)  and Spence  (1984)  have  formally  showed  that  as R&D  spiIlovers  in a given
industry  increase,  die  incentives  to undertake  R&D  diminish.  Thus  the  larger  the spillover  the  lower  will
be incentives  to undertake  R&D investments. Spillovers  also affect productivity  by diffusing  the
knowledge  relating  to less  costly  production  processes.  More  recently  Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1985)  have
argued  that the above  discussion  assumes  that the technical  knowledge  which  "spHied  over" is a public
good  like  a radio  signal  or smoke  pollution  in that  its effects  are  costlessly  realized  by all affected  agents.
Tfhey  argue  that  the above  was not  true of industrial  R&:D  because  the assimilation  or absorption  of this
knowledge  by other  firms,  on the other  hand, is not  well  recognized.'  This  process  depends  on a firm's
capacity  relating  to the assimilation  or absorption  of externally  generated  knowledge.  Nowery  (1983a,
1983!,)  state  that a firm must invest  in its own  R&-D  to be able  to utilize  information  which  is available-16  .
extemally. He observed  that  the more  sophisticated  Is  externally  generated  knowledge,  the greater  Is  the
need  for complementary  in-house  research  to exploit  It.
Cohen and Levinthal  (1985)  present  a formal  model  to demonstrate  that the overall impact  of
R&D capital  spillovers  is ambiguous  due to two offsetting  effects.  A negative  effect associtted with
imperfect  appropriabilLty  of returns  from own  R&D investments  and a positive  incentive  effect  in order
to  assimilate  the scientific and technological  findings generated  by firms, universities  and public
agencies.' Following  Cohen  and Levinthal  approach,  Bernstein  and  Nadiri (1989)  examine  three effects
associated  with the intra-industry  R&D spillover:  first, costs decline  for the externality-receiving  firms
as a consequence  of knowledge's  increases;  second,  factor  demands  changes  in response  to spillovers  have
an impact  on production  structures;  third, R&D spillovers  affect  the rates of capital  accumulation.  As a
consequence,  the combined  effect  of these  three factors  decreases  the rate of R&D investment  and it is
R&D  capital-reducing.  Nelson  and Wintr- (1982)  also  suggest  that since  much  of the detailed  knowledge
of organization  routines  is acquired  only through  experiences  within  the firm,  the internal  R&D  capability
to recognize  the value of, to assimilate  and  to use externally  generated  knowledge  in a timely  fashion  is
essential  fbr success  in a competitive  and technologically  progressive  environment. The existence  of
positive  iLncentive  effect  helps  resolve  the  paradox  posed  by the electronics  and  chemical  industries  where
high levels of spillovers  do not appear  to impede  the level of investnent  in research  and development.
Their resuts suggest  that the high level of spillovers,  combined  with rapid scientific  and technological
advances  from sources  both  inside  and outside  the industry,  provide  an incentive  for the  firm  to maintain
high levels of absorptive  capacity  which, in turn, elicit sufficiently  high levels  of R&D that more than
offset  the negative  appropriability  effect.
Empirical  evidence  on the R&D spillovers  is scant and only a few studies  have estimated  their
impacts  with any rigor.  Mansfield  et al. (1977)  calculated  social and private returns using methods
discussed  above  for seventeen  innovations. They found that median  social return was twice as large
,.-17-
compared to the private retun  (56% vs. 25%).  Further that the private rate of return in one third of the
cases "was so low that no firm, with the advantage  of hindsight,  would have invested in the innovation,
but the social rate of return from the innovation was so high that, from society's point of view, the
investment was well worthwhileZ  (Mansfield  et al. 1977, p. 235).  Bernstein and Nadiri (1986a) also
reach similar condusions. Using U.S. data they found  that the excess of social return over private return
varied from a low of 9 percent for machinery to a high of 76 percent in petroleum  products industries.
The average was 40 percent for the sample as a whole.
A Cauadian study on the subject by Bernstein (19B5a, 1985b)  employed a production  structure
methodology and data on seven industries for the period 1978 to 1981 to estimate the impact of R&D
spillovers.  It concluded that the social rate of return on R&D projects greatly exceeds  the private rate
of retur.  In industries  with a high propensity  to spend on R&D, the net of depreciation  real social rate
of return was 25 percent in 1981, or more than double the net real private rate of 11.5 percent.  In
industries wih  low R&D spending propensities, the social rate of return was 20 percent or more than
two-thirds greater than the private rate.  He attributed the high rates of social returns to spillovers
associated with R&D investment. He found the society's overall demand for R&D projects to be 75
percent greater than the actual demand observed for 1981.  These results are consistent with Longo
(1984)  who found high rates of return to R&D capital. Bernstein  attributed  the high rates of return found
by Longo to be due to spillovers.
More recently, Bernstein and Nadiri (1989f) estimate "the cost-reducing, factor-biasing  and
capital  adjus_tm  effects  of the spillover", described  in the previous  page, fbr four industries  (chemicals,
petroleum, machinery, instrtments) between 1965 and 1978. The existence  of R&D spillovers  implies
that the social and privaterates of return to R&D capital  differ: even in this case, as in the one examined
by Bernstein (1985a, 1985b), the social return exceeds  the private return in each of the four industries
anayzed.18  -
A later canadian  study  focusing  on  the subject  supports  the U.S. findings.  Using  data for nine
major  Canadian  industries,  Bernstein  (1989)'  estimates  the effect of inter-industry  R&D  spillovers  on
production  coDsts:  all  nine  industries  are  influenced  by R&D  spillovers  and,  in particular,  six  of themn  are
affecte by multiple  spillover  sources.  The author computes  also the rate of return to R&D capital  for
each industry  and finds  that it is generally  two and an half to about  four times  greater  than  the private
rate of retur  on physical  capital.  Furthermore,  as for the U.S. industries,  the private rate of return
generated  by R&D capital  is between  three or four timnes  smaller  than  the rate  of return inclusive  of the
inter-industry  spillover  effects.
United  States  and other  western  countries  since 1960s  have  experience  a decline  in the ratio  of
both the number  of registered  inventions  to real  R&D expenditures  and  to the number  of scientists  and
engineers  (S&E)  engaged  in R&D. The magnitude  of the decline  by 1990  is impressively  large: for
United  States,  United  Kingdom,  Germany  and  France  the patentlS&E  ratio were only 55,  44,42, and
40 percent  of their 1969-70  levels. Some  explanations  advanced  are as follows.
Griliches  (1989,  1990)  considers  the rising  costs  of dealing  witht  the patent  system  as the main
reason.  As a consequence,  researchers  have  patented  fewer  of their inventions.  From this  prospective,
the decline  of the patent-R&D  ratio can  be viewed  as the result  of "a decline  in the propensity  to patent
inventions,  rather tha a decline  in the actual  number  of inventions'  (Griliches,  1990).-
Evenson  (1984,  1991,  1993),  instead,  has argued  that the  productivity  of the research  sector  has
decreased  because  of the depletion  of technological  opportunities.  Using a search-research  model  of
invention  potential,  Evemson  tests whether  there are commnon  economy-wide  effects  on changes  in the
patent/R&D  and  patntS&E ratios  and  whether  there  are common  industry  effects.  The results  (Evenson
1993),  based  on a four  countries-  seven  industries  data  set, provide  strong  support  for the "demand-side
explanatione and  particularly for  the importance of the  foreign demand. In  the pooled-industries-19  -
spec-ification,  growing  domestic  demand  and growing foreign  demand are associated  with lower
patentdS&E  ratios.
Kortum  (1993)  emphasizes  that Evenson's  demand-side  story is not capable  of explaining  a
relevant  fraction  of the decline  in the patent-R&D  ratio.  From  his  point  of view,  the value,  of patents  has
been  raised  by the expansion  of the markets  and  that competition  in the research  sector  has implied  a
greater  R&D  expenditure  per  patent.  In particular,  his equUlibrium  model  of industry  growth  predicts  that
an industry  converges  to a steady  state  in which  the inventionlR&D  ratio conftiually  fails if there is
sufficient  growth  in demand.  But this  result  is not  robust:  data  from 20 U.S.  manufacturing  industries
show  a growth  in demand  not rapid  enough  to explain  the decline  in patentIR&D  ratio.  On the other
hand,  the data  corroborate  his intuition  that  the expansion  of markets  ftranslates  into  increaing  value  of
an invention  and  higher  research  expenditures  per invention.
Part  of the empirical  evidence  relative  to R&D  is  been  already  described  in the  previous  sections.
The objective  of  the next  paragraphs  is to highlight  few  studies  which  estimate  R&D, their  features  and
their impact  on the economic  system.
The R&D  costs  during  1970-1982  for 12 U.S.-owned  pharmaceutical  firms  were estimated  by
DiMasi  and  others  (1991):  the cost  estimiates  were  substantially  higher  than  in previous  studies  because
of the  inadequate  measure  of R&D  costs  (Hansen  1979).  In particular,  the  avenage  cost  of New  Chemical
Entities  (NCE)  development  was estimated  to be 231 minlion  dollars', 2.3 times in real  terms  higher
than  previous  estimates.
Data  from 191  US mnfcuigfirms  are used to analyze  the direction  of cauality, in a
Granger  sense,  between  R&D and  investment  for the period 1973-S.i  (Lach  and Schankerman,  1989).
Two  interesting  findings  of  this  study  are:  the  relationship  between  R&D  and  investent is unidirectional,-
in the sense  that "R&D  Granger-causes  investment'  but not  vice  versa. Second,  the firm's investment- -::  ~~~~~~-  20 - I r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2  -
program  aud R&D program  are affected  in the long run by some "conmnon  factors". Moreover,  the
response  to a change  of these  common  factors  is persistent  over time.
The relation  between  trade  flows  and  R&D  is described  in a study  by Charos  and Simos  (1988).
Using a multi-input,  multi-output  model  the authors  estimate  the import  demand  and export supply
functions  fDr  United  State. Tbe  results  of the  study  highlight  the positive  relation  between  R&D  and  level
of imports;  moreover,  exports  are  found  to be human  capital  intensive  while  investment  goods  are R&D
intensive.21- 
2.  R&D CAPITAL  AND PRODUCT MARKET STRUCTURE: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE
This  section  provides  a survey  of the theory  and  evidence  relating  contemporaneous  ralationship
between  R&D  capital  and  product  market  structure. The  focus  is on the following  types  of issues:  What
is the reladionship  between  R&D  capital,  firm size and the nature  of competition?  What  are the effects
of R&D  spillovers  on the industry  performance?  What  is the impact  of asymmetric  information  on R&D
project  financing  as well as on the R&D firm's ability  to profit from its output? The final section
provides  some  tentative  conclusions  relating  the issues  discussed  in this section.
R&D Capi  and Technological  Competiron
It has long been recognized  that technological  innovations  effect  market structure  and since
Schumpeter's  (1950)  important  work  that  market  structure  also  influences  both  the level  of spending  and
the appropriability  of the R&D. In his 'Capitalism,  Socialism  and Democracy,"  Schumpeter  (1950)
argued  that  a market  structure  involving  large firms  with a considerable  degree  of market  power  is the
price that society  must pay for rapid techological advance. the Schumpeterian  hypothesis  has been
contested  in the recent  literature.  For example,  Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1975)  and  Scherer  (1980)  pointed
out that it was unclear whether  highly concentrated  markets  enhanced  the appropriability  of R&D
investnent  or whether  the opposite  was traue  (Fellner 1951, Arrow 1962). Levin and Reiss (1984)
investigated  the relationship  between  market  structure  and R&D investment  using a detailed  industry
equilibrium  model  where  concentration,  R&D  intensity  of  output  and  advertising  intensity  were  all  jointly
determined.  They  found  a strong  positive  effect  of R&D  on industry  concentration  and  a negative  effect
of concentration  on R&D intensity  which  became  positive  for industries  with a high share  of product
rather than  process  R&D.
Nelson  and Wimter  (1982)  also postulated  a model  of Schumpeterian  competition  and focussed
on the competitive  contest  among  innovators  and imitators. They observed  that not only a relatively-22 -
concentated  industry  would  have a tendency  to provide  higher  level of R&D but it would  also be true
that production  and technical  advance  would  be more  efficient  in that  setting. They stated  that where
innvative R&D is profitable,  the firms  that  spend  on innovative  R&D (and  hence  have  a higher  ratio of
R&D  expenditure  to output)  tend  to grow  faster  than  the imitators  but in such a competition  small  firms
are eliminated. On the other  hand where  innovative  R&D is not profitable,  but where  market  structure
permits it to survive, the R&D intensive firms tend to be small.
Dasgupta  (1982)  has questioned  the causal  interpretation  given  to the relationship  between  R&D
investment  and the structure  of industries.  He reasoned  that innovative  activity  and industrial  structure
are siutaeusydetermined  by technological  opportunities,  product demand conditions,  and the
strcture  of financial capital makets.
Technical  advancement  may  create  a 'success breeds  success" spiral. Meron (1973)  termed  it
as the Mathew  effec in reference  to the  passag.  mn  the Gospel  According  to Saint  Mathew  describing  how
the rich wil get richer  and  the poor  poorer. A number  of empirical  studies  have  investigated  the 'success
breeds  sucess'  hypothesis  and concluded  that  past successes  of R&D  investment  lead  to greater  current
R&D efforts. The successfld  firms tend to produce  fiuther innovations  and widen  the gaps between
themselves  and  their  rivals. Conclusions  of a few  selected  studies  follow. Phillips  (1966)  could  not  find
support  for this hypothesis  based  on data  for eleven  U.S. industry  groups. A subsequent  study  (Phillips
1971)  of the commercial  aircraft  market  in the U.S. during 1932-65,  however,  provided  some  support
for the above  hypothesis.  The latter  study  concluded  that  the stream  of innovations  resulted  in a decrease
in the number  of manufiacurers  with large shifts  in market  shares. Comanor  (1964.,  1967)  found that
R&D was a major element  of interfhn rivalry in the pharmaceutical  industry,  with profits largely
dependent  on firms' contiued innovative  success. Pavit and  Wald (1971)  concluded  that opporunites
for small firms  diminish  as techological competition  becomes  more intense.  Grabowski  (1968)  for-23  -
chemical,  drug  and petroleum  industries  found  tihat  past R&D  success  led  to greater  current  R&D effort
and resulted  in widening  the gap between  technologically  successful  firms  and  their rivals.
Several studies have investigated  the  relationship  between R&D capital and  inxustrial
concentration. Horowitz  (1962)  and Hamberg  (1966)  found a weak positive  correlation  with R&D
expenditure  per sales dollar and industrial  concentration.  Freeman  (1965)  found R&D to be an entry
barrier in the oligopolistic  intemational  electronic  capital  goods industry. Mellor  and Tilton (1969)
observed that in the stage of technological  competition,  R&D costs act as a barrier to entry for
semiconductors  and photocopying  industries.  The stage  of technological  competition  is characterized  as
one with many  firms in the industry;  the basic science  well understood;  and the research,  relatively
sophisticated  and specialized.  Scherer  (1967b)  and Kelly  (1970)  suggested  that industrial  concenation
and  R&D  were  positively  correlated  up to "moderate"  levels  of concentration.  Comanor  (1967)  suggested
that  concentration  was also  associated  with  R&D  capital  in industries  where  technological  and  innovatve
opporunities  are  weat  Phillips  (1971)  for Belgian  industry  concluded  that  concentration  and  R&D  effort
tend to be positively  associated  in those industries  with  greatest  technological  opportnities i.e. R&D
intensive  industries. For Canada  Globerman(1973)  found  that for R&D intensive  industries,  research
intensity  varied  inversely  with concentration  (and  directly  with  both foreign  ownership  and government
financing). For other industries,  no significant  relationship  between  research  and concentration  was
discovered. Rosenberg  (1976)  found that the percent of R&D employees  in a firm increased  with
industry  concentration.  He also  discovered  that concentrated  industries  with  firms  of equal  size (market
share) were more R&D intensive. He firther found that entry barriers, as measured  by capital
requirements,  necessary  advertising  levels,  and economies  of scale, tended  to have a positive  effect  on
R&D intensity. Shrieves  (1978)  concluded  that firms  in concentrated  industries  tend to be more  R&D
intensive,  as measured  by R&D associated  personnel,  than  firms  in less concentrated  ones. Leving  and
Reiss (1984)  based  on U.S. data for twenty  manufacturing  industries  and three years  (1963, 1967  and-24-
1972)  established  a strong  positive  effect  of R&D on industry  concentration  and a negative  effect  of
concenation on R&D  intensity  which  becomes  positive  for industries  with  a high  share  of product  rather
than process R&D.  A recent study by Mansfield  (1984)  of twenty-four  U.S. firms in chemical,
petroleum,  steel and drug industries  covering  sixty-five  innovations  introduced  in the past fifty years
indicated  that  less  than  half  of the product  innovations  in all four industries  seemed  to increase  the  four-
firm concentration  ratio.  He observed  that the concentration  increasing  effects  of R&D  may  be much
weaker  than  is commonly  perceived.
A large  number  of studies  have  addressed  the relationship  between  R&D capital  and firm  size.
Their  overall  conclusion  is that  larger  firms  do not  engage  in greater  R&D  activity  relative  to their  size
than  smaller  firms.'  Furthermore,  the technological  possibilities  between  R&D inputs  and innovative
output do not display  any economies  of scale with respect  to the size of the firm in which  R&D is
undertaken.  It is further  indicated  that industries  facing  greater  technological  opportunities  tend  to be
more  concentrated."4  Some  recent  evidence  is reported  here. How and McFetridge  (1976)  studied  the
detminants  of R&D spending  by eighty-one  Canadian  firms in chenical, electrical,  and machinery
industries  during  1967-71.  T.hey  found  that  R&D  spending  increased  more  than  proportionately  than  sales
in the chemical  and  electrical  industries  only  for intermediate  size  firms. Link (1978)  found  that  size is
not  especiafly  conducive  to R&D  in the electrc utility  industry  beyond  some  modest  level. Bound  et a].
(1984)  concluded  thatthe  elasticity  of  R&D  expenditures  with  respect  to firm  size  (measured  by sales  and
gross  plant)  is close  to unity  with  some  indication  of slightly  higher  R&D  intensities  for both  very small
and  very large  firms  in the sample.'
A number  of empirical  studies  have confirmed  that growth  in demand  for the products  of an
industry stimulates  R&D activity wifhin it.  Shmookler  (1966), Rosenberg (1976), Pakes and
Schankerman  (1984)  and Mairesse  and Siu (1984)  support  this result. Pakes  and Schankerman  (1984)
however,  established  that  very litdle  of the observed  differences  in R&D intensity  across  firms  can be-25  -
explained  by either past or even expected  rates of growth of sales or by transitory fluctuations  in these
variables. At the industry  level  of aggregation  however,  they  found  tdat  the variance  in the growth  rate
does  account  for much  of the variance  in R&D  intensity.
R&D Capitd Spilovers and Industry Pcrformance
The appropriability  issue  due to spillover  effects  has two  prominent  facets. One, it has positive
effects  on industry  costs  both in the R&D  performing  and related  industries. Imperfect  appropriability
ensures  that the results  of R&D  are disseminated  elsewhere  and  result  in decrease  in costs. Since  R&D
involves  major  fixed costs  and  relatively  minor  variable  costs, marginal  cost  of R&D would  be sr-all if
not  zero and  allocative  efficiency  requires  that it be priced  so. For R&D  receivers  the relevant  costs  are
the transmission  costs of R&D and these  are expected  not to be significantly  different  from zero and
hence  R&D should  be provided  free. This problem  is analogous  to the provision  of a public  good  and
non-appropriability  serves  to price  it correctly.  Thus  lack  of appropriability  has positive  effects  on R&D
dissemination  and  industry  costs. On  the other  hand  the appropriability  problem  generates  two opposing
incentive  effects  for the R&D  performer. A  negative  incentive  effect  works  to discourage  the firm  from
making  large investments  in R&D  because  it may  not be able  to fully  appropriate  the retrns  associated
with such  investments.' A positive  incentive  effect  arises  because  of the complementarity  of own  R&D
to spuflover  benefits.  The net effect  of these two opposing  imnluences  will determine  whether  the
appropriability  problem  induces  a lower  or higher level of R&D investment  undertaken  by any firm.
Thus  the presence  of imperfect  appropriability  may  not  necessarily  lead  to underinvestment  m innovative
activity. 17
Levin and Reiss (1984)  modelled  spillover  effects as the influences  of firm's own R&D
expenditures  on costs  of all other  firms in the industry. They specified  spillovers  to be a function  of
share  of R&D  devoted  to new  or improved  products  and the ratio of government  R&D  to sales. They==.t= -.. 
-26-
estimated  that  the share  of R&D devoted  to new  and improved  products  had a positive  impact  on the
inter-firm  spillovers  but that the government  funding  diminished  spillovers. The latter result was
unexpecxd  but  the authors  argued  may  be plausible  as the government  support  for R&D  in the U.S. is
mosldy  for large  sce  capital  intensive  defense  systems  which  are  not  cheaply  replicable  for  private  sector
applications.
Bernstein  (1985b)  using  Canadian  data  found  that  the intra-and  intrindustry  spillovers  reduced
average  production  costs of the spillovers  receiving  firms.  The interindustry  spillovers  resulted  in
significant  cost savings  to Canada  as a result of the R&D investment He fiuther established  that
spillovers  from the high R&D  propensity  industries  stimulated  further  R&D investment  by the same
industies. The low-propensity  R&D  industries  on the  other  hand,  substituted  the knowledge  from  these
spillovers  for their  own  projects.  His  overall  conclusion  was  that  in industries  that  exhibit  relatively  rapid
technological  developments,  Canadian  finms  need to carry out their own R&D projects  to remain
competitive.
Jaffe (1986)  modelled  R&D  spillovers  by examining  whether  the R&D  of neighboring  firms  in
teclmology  spade  had an observable  impact  on the firm's  R&D  success. Based  on U.S. data  he found
that firms  whose  neighbors  did  much  R&D  produced  more  patents  per dollar  of their own  R&D,  with
a positive  interaction  that  gave  the  high  R&D  firms  the largest  benefit  from  spillovers.  In terms  of profit
and  market  value,  however,  there were  both positive  and negative  effects  of nearby  firms' R&D. The
net effect  was  positive  for high  R&D  intensive  firms,  but firms  with  R&D  about  one standard  deviation
below  the mean  were  made  worse  off overall  by the R&D  of others.
R&D  Capid  and  Infinnaton  Asmmtry
It is ftequenly argued  that returns  from investment  in R&D are more uncertain  than from
traditional  investment  As  a result,  risk  averse  individuals  discount  these  returns  more  heavily  compared-27  -
to investment in other forms of capital.  This argument is plausible but may be of minr  importance
because  the differentials  in afte tax returns  from R&D  are often  greater  than  the return from traditional
investment  by margins  that could  not be explained  by risk premium  alone.  Furthermore  most firms
undertake  a diversified  portfolio  of R&D  projects  and as a result although  the risk associated  with any
particular  project  failing  may  be quite  large  yet for the group  of projects  in the portfolio  as a whole  there
may be little risk of failure.
Simply  because  R&D is risky  does not mean  that  it should  be treated  any differently  than  other
risky investments  e.g. oil exploration  and development  or futures  markets. What  is special  about  R&D
is information  asymmetry  between  R&D  performer  and  financier.  It is in the interest  of R&D  performer
not to release.  vital information  relating  to the project  to an outside  party  because  of the fear tha release
of such information  may jeopardize  his chances  of success  or someone  else may capitalize  on tha
information. But to raise capital  for a project  requires  releasing  the information  about  the prospective
returns  from the project. In the absence  of detailed  information  necessary  finacing for the project  may
not be forthcoming. The above mimics  an adverse  selection  problem.  Since  information  about the
project  is withheld  from  the finacier, he could  not determine  whether  or not  the project  would  be a good
risk. As a result  an imperfct:  market  for financing  R&D  projects  emerges  providing  an inadequate  level
of finacing.  This problem  arises  in a variety  of situations  and is commonly  referred  to as the "agency
paradigm'. As an example  suppose  an inventor  seeks  to initiat a project  and offers  to sell  shares  in the
project  to obtain  necessary  finiancing.  A potential  investor  would  be uncertain  as to the success  of this
project in the absence  of adequate  data on project  feasibility  and the commitment  of the inventor. To
inspire  greater  confidence  in the  project  by outside  investors,  the investor  must  assume  a substantial  share
of risk  by buying  a majority  interest. This  insures  potential  investors  against  any  moral  hazard  associated
with the project. This means,  however,  that  the project  may  not be undertaken  at all.-28 -
Shapiro  (1985)  has argued  that asymmetric  information  limits  a firm's ability to achieve  the
licensing  gains  from  trade  in R&D. Asymmetric  information  stands  in toe way  of parties  striking  a deal.
Further it may  be difficult  for the innovator  to let others  use his invention  without  giving  them useful
information  in the  on-going  competition  to acquire  additional  patents. It may  also  be costly  or impossible
for the licensor  to monitor  the licensee's  output  so as to charge  per unit royalties.
Asymmetric  information  cannot  only be considered  as a constraint  in the patent acquisition's
process (Shapiro,  1985),  but can also be viewed  as an entry-barrier  (Chen, 1991).  In a model with
incomplete  information,  in fact, a new firm faces an externality  since  the quality  of its products  is
unknown  to the customers.  As  a consequence,  the  firm  cannot  quantify  the effects  of its R&D  investment
on the  average  quality  of production.  The  optimal  way  to internalize  this  externality  is to implement  R&D
subsidies  jointly  with an entry  fee. f firms can signal  the quality  of their products,  then the previous
policy  becomes  not socially  optimal  since  it reduces  ,he incentives  for new  firms  to enter  in the market
-The positive  effect  of R&D  subsidies  and  their  relation  with  market  structure  are also  recognized
by Nakao  (1989).  Using  a model  with  Bertrand  competition  among  firms,  the author  suggests  that  R&D
subsidies  would  be the socially  optimal  policy  only  in the case  of cooperative  oligopoly.  In the case  of
competitive  oligopoly  taxes  would  be the optimal  instruments  to internalize  the extemality  present  in the
economy.  Furtmo  re, the non-  cooperative  Bertrand  behavior  of the firms  or the  joint R&D  ventures
lead to a decline  in the level of welfare  of a society.
An  interesting  finding  relative  to the  determinants  of market  structure  is suggested  by Belman  and
Heywood  (1990).  Testing  the correlation  between  high worker  quality  and concentration  of the market,
the authors  estimate  that including  R&D  measures  leads  to a break-down  of such  relation:  better  quality
workers  are employed  in industries  with large R&D expenditures  "which  happen  to be concentrated"
(Belman  and  Heywood)  because  of the dynamism  and  the technological  opportunities  of such  industries.
To analyze  the dynamic  effects  of product  innovation  and  R&D  investment  on marlket  structure,29 -
researclers have often assumed that the R&D technology was stochastic. Using this approach, Aoki
(1991) compaes  a  deterministic  R&D model with a  stochastic one. The results suggest that the
deterministic  fature  of R&D investment  can help to explain the continual  leadership  of one firm in a
particular industy.  It  follows in this setup that the only effect of stochastic R&D  jointly with the
uncertainty  of a successfil outcome) is to increase  the duration of the competition  among  rival firms.
Isaac and Reynolds  (1988)  employ  a stochastic  model  of R&D investment  to determine  the effects
of market structure and degree of appropriability  on R&D spending.  The simulations  rn  by the authors
suggest  that both the size of the market and the degree  of appropriability  are negatively  correlated with
the level of R&D spending per firm (but a rise in the size of the market will affect positively the
aggregate  R&D spending).
The costs and the benefits deriving  from a new technology  are key variables  in the innovation
process. Lane (1991), using an adjustment  model, tries to isolate the factors that affect the investment
decision  for the coal mining sector in United States  between 1945 and 1975. The main results suggest
that there exists a positive relationship  between  high level of captive production and leaders in the
innovation  process. Moreover, the degree of vertical  integration  has a positive  incentive  on the adoption
decision.
How investors evaluate  the market value of a firm is the focus of the work done by Shevlin
(1991). His starting point is the consideration  whether assets and liabilities  of a R&D firm are affected
(positively)  by a particular type of off-balance  sheet financing, the R&D limited partnerships (1).
Empirical analysis  using a sample  of 103 R&D LPs and for 5 years suggests  that the existence  of LPs
(usually  reported in footnotes  of the balance  sheet)  provides a significant  information  to capital market
agents  in the investment  process.
On the same line of research, Chan et al.(1990)  examine the impact  of the announcements  of
changes  in the level of R&D expenditures  on stock  prices. Over the period 1979-85,  United  States  stock-30-
markets  responded  to R&D  changes'  announcements  with  a long term perspective:  the share  value  of a
firm appears  to be positively  correlated  with  the rise in R&D,  even  if the earnings  of few  firms  initially
decline.  However,  this result doesn't hold for firms defined  as "technologically  mature"  (as sted, oil
refining  or nonferrous  metals),  for which  the announced  change  in R&D expenditure  has a negative
impact.31- 
3.  PUBLIC POLICY AND R & D INVESTMENT
Raionak for Publc Intervention
The case  for goverment intervention  in R&D  activities  is well  known: The social  rate  of return
from R&D is higher than the private rate of return so that it left solely to private initiative  and
investnent,  there  will  be underallocation  of resources  to innovative  activities.  Several  reasons  have  been
cited for the disparity  between  social  and  private  retums. These  include:
E*tnwaldfe
Due  to the  presence  of spillovers,  the R&D  performer  is  not  able  to fully  appropriate  the  benefits
associated  with his R&D activity. Due to the presence  of large numbers  either on the externality
generting side or those  affected  by it, a privately  negotiated  settlement  is almost  never  reached. The
situation  can only  be alleviated  by governmental  action. The same  argument  for public  intervention  is
sometimes  couched  in terms  of public  good natre  of R&D  capital. Once  knowledge  has been  created,
it is almost  freely  appropriable.  Hence  strong  incentives  for free ridership  are created.
This line of reasoning  has not escaped  criticism. For example,  Dasgupta  and Stiglitz  (1980)
showed  that in the presence  of patents,  firms  would  undertake  socially  excessive  R&D  expenditures  in
their attempts  to deter ewlly  wit  patented  innovation.  Their  analysis,  however,  ignores  both  the  positive
and negative incentives  effects of R&D spillovers. Hirscheifer  (1971) has also argued  that R&D
expendiures  in general  would  be undertaken  beyond  their  optimal  levels  because  too many  firms  would
be  ufishingu  for the  same piece of  information. Spence (1984) also argued against restoring
appropriability.  He stated  that restoring  appropriability  not only may create monopoly  or monopoly
power  but also  it incorrecdy  prices  the good  that  R&D  has created. An altenative  effect  of near  perfect
appropriability,  he argued,  would  be the creation  of redundant  and  hence  excessive  levels  of R&D  at the-32  -
industry level.  Thus, there is a tradeoff between positive incentives  of appropriability  on the one hand
'and the efficiency  with which the industry  achieves  the levels of cost reduction it actually  does achieve,
on the other," (p. 102).  Spillovers,  therefore, have a positive partial effect on industry's costs and a
negative effect on incentives.  On the whole, Spence argued that potential industry performance is
significantly  better with high spillovers  (or low appropriability)  because  the output R&D is essentially  a
public good and if it is implicitly  priced as a private good, the performance of the system will be
adversely  affected. Cohen  and Levinlhal  (1985)  also discount  the negative  incentives  effect of spillovers.
They argued that other firms' spillovers  provide a firm with greater incentive to conduct own R&D,
because only through its own R&D, a firm can tap into the knowledge  and associated  benefits generated
by other firms.
The validity  of this argument  is considerably  weakened  by patents  and the requirement  for internal
R&D capability  to benefit from external R&D knowledge. The existing  patent systems confer property
ights for defined  periods thereby restricting  the use of new knowledge. Also the patent systen ensures
greater social benefits with wider use of knowledge  after the expiry of the initial patent.  The problem
is that patents  do not necessarily  confer  perfect appropriability  bLuause  patents can be 'invented around'
or in some instances  may not withstand  a legal challenge  or may simply  be unenforceable  as infringement
might be difficult  to establish. Levin (1986 however, notes that substantial  resources need  to be devoted
to imitate an innovation  even though it may not have any legal protection. Furthermore, a mere failure
of the patent system  to confer  full appropriability  does not necessarily  represent  a policy problem. In fact
strengthening  the patent system might result in almost complete  capture of property rights.  As a result
too much effort might be devoted to inventions  to capture any rents associated witl future use of this
invention. In any case, powerfil incentives  to innovate, even in the absence  of a patent system, exist  in
many  high technology  industries  e.g. the aircraft industry  where  multi-component  systems  provide  built-in
protection against imitation.-33 -
- Ifonmaion Asynuedes
It is frequently argued that returns from investment  in R&D are more uncertain than from
traditional investment. As a result, risk averse  individuals  discount  these returns more heavily than may
be warranted by proper calculation  of riskiness of investment. Thus R&D investment  is underprovided
by the private sector.
The above argument  is plausible  but may be of minor importance  because  the differentials  in after
tax returns from R&D are often greater than the returns from traditional  investment  by margins  that could
not be explained  by risk premium alone.  Furthermore, most firms undertake a diversified  portfolio of
R&D projects and as a result although  the risk associated  with any particular  project failing may be quite
large yet for the group of projects in the portfolio as a whole, there may be little (average)  risk of failure.
Perhaps the most powerfiul  argument  for public support of R&D is the presence of asymmetric
information.  The presence of asymmetric information  between R&D performer and financier limits
financing of R&D projects.  Project success warrants secrecy but project financing  requires release of
vital information. As a result many projects lapse, lacking financing. The asymmetric  information in
the R&D output market also lIhits the R&D firm's ability  to achieve  the licensing gains from trade.
Tax  Incetives for R&D  in Major  Industra Societies
Government  aivities  to stimulate  R&D activities  take a variety of forms.  These include  patent
protection, government  owned  laboratories,  government  contracts  for new products  and processes, grants
and loans, technical  information  services, support of education  and training of scientists, engineers, and
technicians  and tax incentives. Of these activities, the focus is on the provisions  in the tax code that are
intended to stimulate  R&D spending by private sector corporations.
The Government of Canada has a long history of  using the tax code to  encourage R&D
investment  A few significant  landmarks are reported below:34- 
BdeHistor  of Tax Incenties for R&D
Pre-16  -Current  expenditures  on R&D were made  fully  deductible  in the year incurred.
- One-third  of the capital expenditures  on R&D during the two preceding years were
deductible  in the current  year.
- The Total deduction  for R&D was limited  to 5 percent of the previous  year's taxable
income  unless  the expenditures  were approved  by Revenue  Canada.
1961  - Capital  expenditures  were  made  fully  deductible  in the year  incurred  or any  year  thereafter.
1962  - The requirement  for approval  by authorities  of expenditures  in excess  of 5 percent of
previous  year's taxable  income  was eliminated.
- 50 percent  of an increase  in R&D  expenditures  (current  or capital)  over the base, defined
as expenditures  in 1961,  was deductible  from taxable  income.
1967  - The 50 percent deduction  for all R&D expenditures  in excess of the 1961 base was
replaced  by grants  under  the  Industrial  Research  and  Development  Incentives  Act  (IRDIA).
This act provided  a cash grant of 25 percent of capital  expenditures  and 25 percent of
current expenditures  in excess  of the average  expenditures  made during  the base  period.
The latter  period  was defined  as the five years preceding  the grant year. The 25 percent
tax grant  was non-taxable.
1975  - The deferral  privilege  for capital  R&D  expenditures  was extended  to current  expenditures.
Now  both  current  and  capital  R&D  expenditures  could  be written  off in the year  they  were
incurred  or any  year thereafter.
1976  - Industrial  Research  and Development  Incentives  Act repealed.
1977  - R&D investment  tax credit introduced.  The credits ranged from 5 to  10 percent,
depending  upon the region. The credit  applied  to all current  and capital  expenditures  for
R&D.- 35  -
--  he higher (10%) credit applied to R&D expenditures in the Atlantic provinces and the
Gaspe are of Quebec.
1978  - R&D investment  tax credits were raised to 10 percent for most of Canada, 20 percent in
Atlantic Canada and  Gaspe region,  and a  25 percent credit  for  small business was
intoduced.
- An additional tax allowance of 50 percent of total R&D expenditures in Excess of the
average level over the previous three years was introduced.
1983  - The rates of credit for scientific research expenditures were increased by  10 percentage
points.  The basic rate was raised to 20 percent of the R&D expenditures, except for
expenditures made in the Atlantic  provinces and the Gaspe where it was 30 percent. Small
business credit rate was increased to 35 percent.
- The limit on the amount of tax credit a taxable firm can claim in a year was removed.
- Unused credits were permitted to be carried forward for seven years and carried back three
years to offset federal taxes.  40 percent of unused credits earned in the year by the small
business and 20 percent for large corporations could be  refimded.  This refundability
provision was set to expire in May 1986.
- Ihe  50 percent additional allowance was eliminated.
- As  a temporary measure, tax credits not claimed by corporations were allowed to be
trasferred  to individuals who purchased new issues of the corporation's stock.
- As a :zemporary  measure, a portion of the value os unused credits was paid in cash to non-
taxable corporations and unincorporated businesses.
A  new financing mechanism termed  as  Scientific Research Tax  Credit (SRTC  was
uroeiled in April 1983 and made law in January 1984.  Its principal elements were as
follows:36- 
*investors  earned  the 50 percent  tax credit  by purchasing  shares,  or debt, or an interest
*im the products  or revenues  of the R&D  performing  company  (whether  related  to R&D
perfbrming  company  or not).
*For every  dollar raised by the R&D corporation  under such tax credit  finacing, the
corporation  was liable  for a refundable  tax equal  to the credits  given  by the investors.
*The R&D performing  company,  at any time after raising capital  was permitted  to
renounce  its claim  to R&D  tax deductions  and  tax credits  it could  otherwise  claim. The
R&D performing  corporation  was able to claim  a rebate  of its refundable  tax credit  at
the rate of 50 percent  of the amount  of R&D expenditures  for which  it renounced  its
cl,aim,  to tax incentives.
*Where the investor  was an individual,  the credit  was set at 34 percent of the amount
designated  in respect  of the qualifying  investment  made, to be offset against  federal
basic taxes. The computation  of provincial  income  taxes meant  that a total effective
rate of credit of approximately  50 percent was provided. In the case of a corporate
investor,  the credit  was 50 percent,  to be applied  against  federal  taxes.
1984  -Moratorium  on certain "quick  flip" SRTC investmnents  was announced  on October 10,
1984. Nearly  60%of SRTC  claimned  involved  "quick  flip" tanactions, in which  investors
and the companies  bought  and sold the credits.
In a typical  "quick  flip"  transaction"  an investor  would  lend  a research  company  $100  with
$55 to be repaid on demand. The investor  would  then receive $50 from the federal
government  as a credit. After  a short  period, the investor  would  be repaid  his loan. The
repayment  of $55  plus the receipt  of $50 of the credit  when  the tax return  was processed,
provided  the investor  with a gain of $5.
1985  -SRTC  repealed  in May 1985.- 37 -
- Tax  credits  eamned by  small  Canadian-controlled private  corporations  for  current
expenditures on  R&D were made  100 percent refundable.  This provision was made
effective May 23, 1985 with no expiry date.
- The provision that the expenditures eligible for the R&D incentives must be  "wholly
attributable' to R&D was replaced  by a provision that an expenditure "all or substantially
all" of which is attributable to R&D will qualify.
- The  term  'scientific  research" was changed to  "scientific research  and  experimental
development".  This change was done to recognize that the bulk of industrial R&D is
concentrated on the experimental development of new products or processes rather than
pure and applied research.
R&D Tax Crdi  currendy avaiabl  in Canada
Section 37 of the Income Tax Act allows taxpayers to deduct all current and capital expenditures
for R&D in the year in which they were incurred. In addition an investment tax credit for R&D is also
available to Canadian industry.  The basic credit is 20 percent of the taxpayer's expenditure on R&D,
except for expenditures made in the Atlantic provinces and the Gaspe where it is 30 percent.  A 35
percent  credit  applies on  the  first  $2  million of  current  expenditures on  scientific research  and
experimental development  by small business.
Credits may be used to fully offset federal taxes otherwise  payable.  Any balance of the tax credit
in the year may be carried back for three years or carried forward for five years to offset federal taxes.
A portion of  any credit that  is unused in the year it is earned is refundable to  businesses.  Large
corporations are entitled to a 20 percent refimd of unused credits in the year, while small corporations
and unincorporated businesses are entitled to a 40 percent refund.38-
Tax Inwendves  for  R&D In Major Industrial Societies
United  S  : ofA  Amrica:  The U.S. Government  has tried to lower the cost of private R&D
througb a combination  of tax policy, direct spending and patent legislation. Major tax incentives include
(1) allowing firms to deduct qualified R&D expenses in the year incurred.  Section 174 of the Intenal
Revenue Code petmits business taxpayers to deduct all research or experimental  expenditures in the year
they are incurred.  Businesses have also the option to capitalize R&D expenditures and amortize them
over a five year or longer period.  Expenditures on capital assets such as land, building and equipment
used for R&D are not eligible fbr immediate  expensing. Since R&D expenditures are presumed to lead
to an asset with a usefil life in excess of one year, immediate expensing provides a tax incentive.  (2)
giving them a 25 percent credit on increases in qualified research and experimentation (R&E) expenses
above the previous three years'  average; and  (3) permitting them to  fund research through limited
partnership.  It  is to be noted that the U.S. tax code makes a distinction between basic research and
product development. While basic research costs are eligible for the credit and other tax benefits, only
development  costs incurred in the course of experimentation  in the laboratory sense are eligible  for special
tax consideration.  Other development costs must be capitalized.
The R&D tax credit passed by the Congress in 1981 has been criticized on the grounds that it
provides only weak incentives  for research and could potentially give incentives to defer such projects.
For  example, a  firm steadily increasing its  R&D spending will  receive less  credit per  dollar of
incremental R&D spending than the firm that raises its R&B spending for only one year.  Perhaps, most
important the credit does not help firms reverse a downward trend or even a one-year drop in R&E
spending.  Fifteen percent of firms fit in this category.  The tax credit also is not of much use for new
firms.
The R&D limited partnership (RDLP) reduces the cost of R&D to high technology firms by
permitting tax shelters for R&D projects.  An RDLP is typically sponsored  by a corporation which may39 -
also serve  as a general  partner, seeking  to fund research  projects  without  incurring  the disadvantages  of
more convendonal  financing. The limited  partners  who  are usually  persons  in high tax brackets  provide
the fimds;  they can immediately  deduct  most of their investment  from income  and receive  their return
in the form of tax-advantaged  long term capital  gain. Like most  such shelters,  RDLPs  use the tax laws
to drive  a wedge  between  what investors  earn  and  what the issuing  firms  must  pay; the wedge  is revenue
loss to the Treasury. If the research  pays off, the revenue  loss may be as high as 80 percent of the
research  costs.
Scientific  organizations  are also tax exempted  as a measure  of support  for scientific  research
carried out  by these  institutions.  In addition,  individual  and corporate  contributions  to such  organizations
are tax deductible up to certain limits.
The U.S. tax code  also  treats revenues  from the sale of patents  by individual  investors  as capital
gains  and thus qualifying  for preferential  tax treatment. Corporate  transactions  of patents  and licenses
also frequently  qualify  for capital  gains  treatment.
Since a disproportionate  share of R&D investment  is done by small business in the U.S,
preferential  tax treatment  of small  firms  as opposed  to large  firms,  indirectly  provides  incentives  for R&D
investment
Finally,  almost  all incentives  for investment  also encourage  R&D investment  and  affect  the speed
at which  technical  change  is embodied  in capital  stock.
France: Government  grants  up to 50% of the  cost of a project  are  provided  for R&D  investment.
The grant is treated  as a loan  for tax purposes  rather than as income  to the company. Expenditures  for
R&D are fiully  deductible  in the year  incurred. R&D plant and equipment  investment  also qualifies  for
accelerated  depreciation. Firms that do R&D exclusively  receive  special  tax treatment. Royalties  and
patent  sales are not taxed if reinvested  within  three years-40-
West Germany: All R&D expenditures  can be deducted in the year incurred.  Plan: and
equipment  devoted  to R&D is subject  to accelerated  depreciation  allowances. A cash  grant of 7.5% of
R&D capital  invesenet is aviable  to qualifying  R&D  investmnent.  Further  cash or credit assistance  is
available  to a nmber of R&D intensive  industries. Individual  and corporate  donations  for scientific
purposes  are tax deductible  and corporate  support  of research  organizations  which  execute  a program  of
cooperative  R&D for an industry  receives  a generous  tax allowance.
Ja.pan: All R&D expenditures  and costs of developing  patent rights can be either expenses
immediately  or amortized  over several  years.  A 25 percent tax deduction  is allowed  on those  R&D
expenditures  which  represent  an increase  over the  highest  R&D  expenditures  which  represent  an incmeas
over the highest  R&D  expenditures  incurred  by the company  in any  year  since  1967. Special  accelerated
depreciation  allowances  are provided to approved  investments  in new technology.  Joint research
associations  in certain  industries  can immediately  expense  the cost  of new machinery  and equipment  or
a new facility.  Special  tax incentives  are provided  to small and medium  sized enterprises. A large
number  of government  agencies  provide  direct  support  for approved  scientific  projects.
United  Kingdom:  R&D current  and capital  expenditures  can be deducted  in the year incurred.
Corporate  and individual  donations  for R&D  do not qualify  for tax deduction.  Direct  support  for R&D
investment  is available  from various  govermnment  departments  and agencies.
Tax Policy wnd  the Cost  of R&D Capita
The previous  section  noted  that two types  of tax incentives  are currently  available  in Canada.
First, the cost of R&D)  capital  is reduced  by allowing  immediate  expensing  of R&D expenditures.  This
is equivalent  to a 100  percent  capital  consumption  allowance  (CCA). Second,  R&D current  and capital
expenditures  are eligible  for a tax credit  which  varies  by size of business  and  location  of activity. Thus
both measures  lower  the cost of R&D and  provide  incentives  to undertake  more of suck  investmnent.  To-41  -
see the effects  of these measures  more clearly,  consider  a $1 expenditure  on R&D. This expenditure
would  reduce  the  taxable  income  by $1 and  assuming  a marginal  tax rate of 46 percent,  the tax deduction
will be 46 cents. The post-tax  cost of a dollar  of R&D  expenditure  is thus 54 cents. Ccntrast  this  to the
case where R&D expenditures  were eligible  for a CCA rate of 30 percent and assume  that future
depreciation  deductions  are discounted  at 15 percent. Under these assumptions,  the present  value of
depreciation  deductions  is 67 cents. The tax reduction  is obtained  by multiplying  this number  by the tax
rate and equals  31 cent.  The post-tax  cost of a dollar of R&D expenditure  is then  69 cents, which  is
greater  than the 54 cents  under  the immediate  expensing  provision."
Next consider  the combined  effects  of the deductibility  provision  and the tax credit  on the cost
of R&D capital. Suppose  the credit rate is 10 percent. The deductibility  provision  in the absence  of a
tax credit  reduces  taxes  by 46 cents  per dollar ($1 x marginal  tax rate) of R&D expenditure.  The credit
reduces  the tax liability  by 10 cents  but reduces  eligible  R&D  expenditures  for deductibility  purposes  by
the same  amount. Ihus the tax reduction  from the deductibility  provision  in the presence  of a 10  percent
tax credit is 41 cents  (.90 x .46) and the total tax reduction  from both measures  is 51 cents. The tax
credit,  therefbre,  contributes  about  6 cents  to tax reduction  per dollar  of R&D  expenditure.  The post-tax
cost of a dollar of R&LD  capital  under this scenario  is 49 cents. Thus the subsidy  rate is more  than 50
cents  per dollar of R&D expenditure.  Table 4.1 reproduced  from Bernstein  (1986)  presents  estimates
of post-tax  cost of one dollar of R&D expenditures  by size of business and by region of activity.
Currendy the post-tax  cost of a dollar of R&D expenditure  is lowest for large non-manufacturing
industries  in the Atlantic  region  (62%  subsidy)  and  the highest  for small  firms  anywhere  in Canada  (51% 
subsidy).
While  the rate of subsidy  is important,  the effectiveness  of subsidy  also determined  by the tax
status  of the firm  Incentives  are much  less attractive  to firms in a non-taxable  position. In 1980  such
firms  undertook  47 percent  of total R&D capital  expenditures  (see  Table  4.2).-42 -
The  limpad  of Tax  Incentives  on Investment:  A Survey  of Empiicod  Approaches  and Research  Findngs
Empirical  approaches to  evaluation of  tax incentives have varied from  opinion surveys to
rigorously derived testable models and from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium analysis.  Tbis
section provides an overview of the principal approaches, notes their key assumptions and caveats and
surveys research findings of selected studies.
Surv  of Firms
Opinion surveys of company executives have been frequently used to evaluate the effectiveness
of R&D tax incentives. Mansfield and Switzer (1985) represents a recent example of such an approach
using Canadian data.  The findings of this study are presented below.
The authors divided Canadian R&D firms into two groups: (1) The 65 corporations doing most
Of  the R&D in 1981; and (2) The remaining 1305 R&D perfonning firms.  A stratified random sample
of 55 firms was chosen and the company officials were interviewed to ascertain their views on the
effectiveness  of the two R&D tax credits in place during the early 1980s. An analysis of these responses
suggests that the incentive effect of the two tax credits was much smaller than the revenue foregone as
a result of these measures ($50 million of additional R&D at a cost to federal treasury of $130 million
in 1982).
An objective assessment of the impact of tax measures is not possible through opinion surveys.
Opinion surveys do not provide any data on observed behavior both before and after a policy change and
hence the validity of their results is doubtful.
Estnation of Ad hoc/Edcedic  Equations
This approach  usually specifies R&D spending to be a function of a host of independent  variables
including  R&D tax credit.  Variables  selection and model specification  are most often based on a "fishing
expedition" for a high coefficient of multiple determination, R2.43 -
Mansfield  and Swie  (1985)  specify  an ad hoc model  to estimate  the impact of R&D tax credits
on R&D spending  by the Canadian industry.  In their model, R&D spending by industry is a function
of industry  sales during  the current year and a time trend. Parameters  obtained  in this equation  were then
related to the nature of prevailing tax incentives  in each year.  The results indicate  that $132 million of
federal tax expenditures  for R&D produced  $30 million  of new R&D capital.
Investment  Moda
The following  five principal  models have been used to analyze  tax incentives:
CL)  The Flexible Capital  Stock Adjustment  Model or the Accelerator  Theory of Investment;
(ii)  The Q-Model;
(iii)  General Forward-Looking  Models;
(CV)  Effective Tax Rate and Return-Over-Cost  Models; and
(v)  The Production  Structure  or the Adjustnent Cost Approach.
A brief description  of these approaches  is given in the following  paragraphs.
(i)  The  Flexble Capial  Stock  Adjustnent  Approach
The simple, or naive, form of the acceleration  principle postulates a certain fixed relationship
between  the desired capital stock and output. It is argued that tax incentives  affect investment  through
changes  in desired capital stock by reducing the relative price of capital.  For illustrative  purposes the
Hall-Horgenson  approach  is outined here.
Employing  a Cobb-Douglas  production  technology, the desired capital stock, K can be obtained
as follows:
C: = a (Ptot/ct)-44-
Where P -price  of output
Q  quantity of output
c  user cost of capital
Of elasticity  of output with  respect  to capital
Net investment  (I)is  a weighted  average  of past changes  In the desired  capital  stock,  such tiat:
i~~  E.  .Kw 
8-0
By imposing  restrictions  on the sequence  (wj), net investment  becomes:
_-  w  AK;  + W-AC,1 - W
Recaling the equation  for the desired  capital  stock,  the investment  function  can be written  as follows:
=  W, AL  +o  -.  W 1 A  P-Lt-  W2t2+  et
Ct  ct-2
where  et is the error term.
Changes  in tax incentives  alter the user cost of capital,  which  in tur  changes  the desired  stock
of  capital.  Changes in the deired  stock of capital then lead to  changes in  net investment  (or
disinvestment).
Braithwaite  (1975),  May (1976)  and Harman  and  Johnson  (1978)  used this general  approach  in
evaluating  Canadian  tax incentives.  Braithwaite  and  May  focussed  on the impact  of  the accelerated  capital
consumption  allowances  and  reduced  corporate  tax razes  for manutcturing and  processing. Harman  and
Johnson  looked  at the CCAs  and deferred  allowances.  Harman  and  Johnson  employed  the Coen  Model,-45 -
a varlant  of the  Hall-Jorgenson  model  with  better  specification  of the production  technology  and  the speed
of adjustinent  in response  to changes  in the user cost  of capital. Harman  and  Johnson  concluded  that the
incentives  impact  investment  but the associated  revenue oso is often greater  than  the investment  gains.
(ii)  The  Q-Theory  Approach
The essence  of Tobin's "q" theory  model  is that  a firm  will invest  as long  as a dollar  spent  buying
capital  raises the market  value of the firm by more  than  one dollar. Since  q is defined  as the ratio of the
market value of existing  capital  to its replacement  cost, then investment  will take place  as long as q is
greater than  unity.
Summers  (1981)  employed  this general approach  to examine  the impact  of various  tax policies
on investment. He assumes:  (1) Constant  returns  to scale  technology;  and (2) Firms maintain  a constant
debt to capital  stock  ratio (b).
Firms maximize  the market  value of equity  and bonds  at time t:
St  'l7  (1-0)  DIV  sds  +  Bt
where
9  =  dividend tax rate
C  - capital  gains  tax rate
DIV.  =  after-tax  profits minus  investment  expenses
[pF (K, L) -WL-pbik]  (i-x)  - (1-ITC-2-b)  +  (1-r)  4pI+pbK  (s-8)
p  c  overall price level
i  =  nominal interest rate-46 
r  =  corporate  tax rate
z  =  present  value  of depreciation  allowances  on a dollar of new investment
B  e  present  value  of depreciation  allowances  on existing  capital
*  =  adjustment  cost function
I  =  investinent
a  =  inflation  rate
a  =  rate of economic  depreciation  of the capital  stock
,  = exp  I - (P+7)) du
t  (I1-C)
p  =  fixed  real after tax return.
Firms choose an investment  and financial  policy  to maximize  the value of equity  and bonds,
subject to the constraint  that capital accumulation  equals net investment. Solving  the optimization
problem  generates  the following  investnent  function:
(V-B)  (1-C)  _  1+ b  + ITC  + z
I/K  (l-r)()
If an adjustment  cost function  of the following  form is employed:
*  =  3B/2 (I/K  - v) 2
then an investment  finction which  is linear  in Q results.
I/K  =  v  +  (1/B)Q-47 -
This is the basic equation  estimated  by Summers  (1981).
(iii)  Genera!  Forward Lookdng  Models
The decision  mle governing  investment  in  the General  Forward  Looking  Model  (GFL)  is identical
to that in the q theory but the two theories  differ in how the unobservable  expectations  are related  to
observable  variables. Unobservable  expectations  have been defined in either two step, one step, or
traisformation  procedures.
The two  step procedure  is based  on a decomposition  of the investment  problem  into expectation
formation  and  given  these  expectations,  the  decision  to acquire  investnent  goods. Expectations  are based
on lagged  variables  and the parameters  derived  from expectations  equations  are used to forecast  future
variables  that replace  unobservable  expectations. These  variables  are then used to estimate  production
and adjustment  parameters.
giv)  Effctve  Tax Rates and Return-Over-Cost  Models
Feldstein  (1980)  is the proponent  of effective  tax rate  approach  to incentives  evaluadon.  Feldstein
posits that net investment  is dependent  on the net-of-tax  real return  to capital. Net of tax real reurn
depends  on effectve tax rate which is defined  as the ratio of a comprehensive  measure of all taxes
assessed  on capital  income  to operating  income  less depreciation.
The return-over-ost model (also  presented  by Fcidstein)  quantifies  investment  incentives  by
coasting  the maximum  potential  net retr  (WNR) on a standard  investment  project  with the cost of
fumds  (COP).  MPNR is influenced  by tax incentives. Whenever  the maximum  potential  net retun
exceeds  the cost of funds, fims have an incentive  to acquire  more capital.48 -
(v)  The Production Structure/A  dusanent Cost Approach
The essence  of this approach  is that  capital  is subject  to adjustment  costs  in that  investment  causes
output  to be foregone,  as factors  of production  are diverted  to install  the additions  to the capital  stock.
As a result,  firms  cannot  move  instantaneously  to a new  level  of the capital  stock  but instead  must  adjust
over time  to the desired  level. For this reason,  the capital  input  is termed  a quasi-fixed  factor,  whereas
the labor input  (which  adjusts  instantaneously)  is a variable  factor.
To illustrate an application  of this approach, a recent study by Jeff Bernstein (1985) is
summarized  here.  Bernstein  develops a dynamic  model of corporate  production,  which integrates
financial  and production  decisions. Output is a function  of physical  capital,  R&D capital and labor,
where  both capital  inputs  are subject  to adjustment  costs. The production  technology  is represented  by:
y(t) = F{L(t),KX(t),  K,(t), ./t), USt))
Fj  >  OFj 1 <  Oj =  Ip,Ir
where  p = physical  capital
r  = R&D capital
I =  Investment
Firms operate in the interest  of their shareholders  and so maximize  the present  value of their
equity. Eqiivalently  the firms  minimize  costs  subject  to appropriate  restraints. Inverting  the  production
function  yields  the labor requirement  function:
L = G(K, YK,I, I,  y)
The cost minimization  problem  then is:
Min  I 1 ,  T  7j t  [WLG (%, Kr,  Iv,  Ir,  y)  + WA  + W  w1 Y-  dt-49-
s.  t.  K 4 - Ii- 6 1K 1 imp  capital
Accumulatinn
K, (o)  -K  >  O
conditions
where
p  =  cost of equity  capital
WL  p,r  =  rental  rates  on labor,  physical  and R&D  capital  respectively
6.  =  depreciation  rate  of the ith capital  stock.
If J (K,, K,, w,,  w,, wL,  y) is defined  to be the mininized  present  value  of costs,  then  one can
aP  jand  aPj
derive  w  - w
Solving  these  two  equations  generates  a system  of equations  for L, K, and  K,. Bernstein  estimates
this system  of three equations. The nature  of L, K, and  K, depends  on the particular  functional  form
taken  by J.
Bernstein  considered  the impact  of two Canadian  R&D  tax incentives  (the R&D  investment  tax
credit and the special  research  allowance)  on R&D investnent. Note that this model  could  also be
employed  to analyze  the effects  of incentives  on physical  investnent. Bernstein  used a pooled  set of
cross-section  and time series  data  for 27 finns for the period 1975-80.  The incentives  were evaluated
in terms  of increased  R&D  expenditure  per dollar  of lost  revenue,  for a realistic  range  of price  elasticity
of product  demand. He found  that one dollar increase  in tax expenditures  resulted  in more than one
dollar  of new  R&D  capital.50- 
A large  majority  of coDmplex  interactions  in an ecoDnomy  are  assumed  away  by partial equilibrium
analysis. An applied  general  equilibrium  model  on the other hand,  can  provide  a disaggregated  view of
the economy  and  thereby  yield  quantitative  estimates  of all important  interactions.  It is therefore,  a more
valuable  tool in assessing  the relative  merits  of alternative  tax policy  changes.
Applied general equilibrium  analysis  entails several sequential  steps.  First, basic data are
collected  from a variety  of sources. These  data are then  adjusted  for microconsistency.  Next the choice
of model,  finctonal forms and elasticity  parameters  are specified.  Parameter  values  for model  functions
are then determained  through  calibration. A replication  test is carried  out to check  that the calibrated
parameter  values are consistent  with the original  data on quantities  and prices and the assumed  model
structure. Once  this replication  test is passed, a policy  change  is specified  and a new (counterfactua)
equilibrium  is computed. Policy  evaluation  is then  based  on pairwise  comparison  between  benchmark
and new equilibrium.
The applied  dynamic  sequenced  model  developed  by Hamilton,  smitz,  Shah  and  Whalley  (1985)
estimates the impact of tax changes on investment, factor use, output, savings, public revenues and
overanl welfare  -aie  and losses.  This model could be applied to  evaluate the impact of R&D tax
incentives.
Directions  For This  Study
The above discussion suggests that a production structure approach yields important insights on
the impact of tax policy on business  production, investment  and financing decisions. This study specifies
a  rigorous production structue  rasmework  and estimates it using flexible functional forms.  The
superiority of the empirical approach adopted in this study is demonstrated  using theoretical criteria.4.  TAX POuICY,  PRODUCflON STRUCTURE  AND  R&D CAPITAL
This study examines  the production  relationship  in Canadian  industries  using a model which
incorporate R&D capital  as an input in addition  to the usual factors  of production  namely  physical
capital,.  labor  and intermediate  inputs. The  analysis  of production  relations  traditionally  have  been  carried
out using a production  function  approach  by specifying  output as a function of inputs and by using
functional  forms which imp)ose.  restrictions  on factor substitution  possibilities.  Recent  developments  in
production  economics  have  resulted  in improved  representation  of production  technology  by utilizing  the
dual relaton  between cost and production  and by using flexible functional  forms in  econometric
estmation.
Given  a production  function,  there exists  a corresponding  cost futnction.  This dual relation  was
formally  established  by Shepard's  lemma  (1953). The duality  theory implies  that  if the firm  minimize
cost  and input  prices are exogenous,  and if the  product  transformation  function,  T(Q,X)  =0,  (where
Q  denotes  output  and X a vector  oaf  inputs),  satisfies  the usual  reguarity conditions  (i.e. strictly  convex
isoquants),  there exists a dual cost function  C(Qj), where P is a price vector, which is as good a
representation  of the firm's production  technology  as the product  transformation  function  and which
satisfies  the following  regularity  properties:
(1)  C is non-negative,  differentiable,  non-decreasing,  linearly  honmogenous  and concave  on
P for fixed  non-negative  output  Q.
(2)  C is strictly  positive  for non-zero  output  Q  and is strictly  increasing  in Q.
Thus  for well  behaved  relationships,  one can  deduce  the structure  of production  technology  directly  from
the cost function.
Recent works of Diewert (1971)  and others  have demonstrated  that the application  of duality
theorem  and  the specification  of a flexible  functional  form el  iminates  the need  for a priori restrictions  on-52  -
the-  production-set. Furthermore,  flexible  functional  formns  allow us to test for separability  (a firm's
decision on the use of one or more inputs is independent  of the rest of the inputs),  homotheticity
(relationship  between  scale and factor intensities)  and consistency  in aggregation. In view of these
features,  a flexible  functional  form approach  is adopted  here.
From the duality  correspondence  between  the production  and  cost  functions,  one can  utilize  either
of the two methods  of deriving  input  demand  and cost  share equations.
(a)  Postulate a functional  form for the production  function satisfying  certain regularity
conditions,  and then  solve  for the output  constrained  cost minimization  problem  which
is used in deriving  the input  demand  function  and  hence the cost share  equations.
(b)  Postulate  a differentiable  functional  form  for the industry  cost  function  satisfying  certain
regularty conditions and obtain the derived input demand functions  by  applying
Shephard's  lemma.
The cost fimction  approach  is more commonly  used than a production  function  approach  in estimating
parameters  because  it has the following  advantages:
(1)  Estimation  of parameters  is much  easier  using  a cost  function  than  a production  function.
(2)  Tests  on elasticities  of substitution  between  factor inputs  are more  easily  carried  out  with
the cost function  approach  since  the required  standard  errors are readily  available.
(3)  The production  function  method  uses inputs  as arguments  while  cost function  has output
and input  prices as arguments. Thus a cost ir-imizadon approach  implicitly  assumes
entrepreneurs  make  decisions  on factor  use according  to exogenous  prices, which  makes
the  factor  levels  endogenous  decision  variables. Since  the choice  of inputs  is endogenous
to the firm and the production  function  approach  is concerned  with the direct use of
inputs,  this needs  endogenous  treatment  of the input  variables  leading  to a simultaneous- 53 -
estimation  problem. The cost function  approach  avoids  this problem  but requires  that
one assume  that individual  producers  cannot  influence  prices.
(4)  Given  an exogenous  shock  on input  prices, it would  be easier  to examine  the impact  on
factor demands  by using an estimated  cost function  than a production  function.
(5)  Recent  productivity  studies  measure  total factor  productivity  growth (TFP)  as a sum of
technical  change  effects  and scale effects. However,  in order to estimate  TFP, or to
separate  scale  effects  from  technological  change  effects  an estimate  of the scale  elasticity
is required. The scale  elasticity  can  be obtained  direcdy  from an estimated  cost  finction.
(6)  Cost  functions  are homogenous  in prices  regardless  of the properties  of homogeneity  in
the production  function.
(7)  Prices are likely to be less collinear, then inputs.  This implies  that a cost finction
approach  may  encounter  less  multicollinearity  than a production  function  approach.
Becse  of the above  advantages,  the cost function  approach  is implemented  in this study. While  the
issue of choice  among  various  flexible  functional  forms is far from settled, translog  fimction  is often
shown  to be preferable  over alternative  forms. The non-homodietic  translog  cost function  will be used
as the maintained  hypothesis  in this study.
lTe  Modd
In the specification  of the translog  function,  a five input production  model  is considered  here.
The inputs  are:
(1)  Capital  stock  - structures  (and and buildings)  (S)
(2)  Capital stock - machinery (M)
(3)  R&D Capital  stock  (RDK)
(4)  Intermediate  inputs  (II)-54  -
(5)  Labor (L)
A translog cost fimution of the usual form incorporating  these inputs can be represented as follows:
InR  C  so  +  o ln  Q  + 1/2 yo.  lriO2
4-  4L11n  P1 + 1/2  Yij In  Pi  In  p±
*  SyoL  lnQ  lnPi
4 +t  t  +  1/2  $tt  t2
4it *eri  t  ln  Pi  + 4v  t  lnQ  e  (1)
where  C =  total cost-=  11
Pi =  price of input i
where i =  S, M, RDK,  l, L
=  quantity of input  i
t =  technological dcange-55  -
The translog  cost finction (1) is a second  order  logarithmic  Taylor  series expansion  of a twice
differentiable  analytic  cost fimction  around  unity.
Cost-minimizing  derived demand equations  for the various inputs are obtained from (1) by
logarithmically  differetiating this function  with respect  to input  prices and applying  Shephard's  lemma
i..  ac  xpr
i.e.  x  *  x.  The derived demand equations  obtained from this process  can be written as:
alnC  Pi  c  =  S,  =  C  i  yi1ln  Pj + yaI ln  Q +  tpi t  (2)
alupjL c  5~~~~~~~~-1
where S3  is the share of the iti  input in total cost.  A "well-behaved"  cost function  must satisfy  the
following  conditions:
(1)  Hicks-Samuelson  symmetry  conditions
yj  - >yj  (Slutsky  symetry)
(2)  Linear  homogeneity  condition  (or  zero homogeneity  in prices)  i.e.. when  all factor  Drices
are doubled,  the total cost will double. It can be shown  that  linear  homogeneity  implies
the following  restrictions:
i  =  1,
iY±j  0 ,-56 -
11Yoi 'O°r
*  0=  for  all  ij
(3)  Monotonicity:  The function must be  an  increasing  finction of  input prices i.e.
al  logp  Pi  ,  S,  M,  RDK,  II,  L
Due to the homogeneity  constraint,  only (n-1)  share  equations  (2) are linearly  independent  and
can be estimated  simultaneously.  Therefore,  one of the five share equations  is to be deleted  leaving  a
system  of five equations  (the  translog  cost  function  and four  share  equations)  to be estimated  using either
a non-linear  multivariate  svstem estimator  or Zellner's seemingly  unrelated  regression  technique  (see
Kmenta  (1971),  p. 518).
Elasticites of Substution  and Eaicities  of Factor Demand:
Elasticites of Substion  (AES)
The elasticities  of substitution  (ore's)  are specific  to pairs of inputs  (e.g. between  inputs  i and  j)
and as such summarize  economic  interrelations  between  two inputs  only. In a two input  specification,
(ar) must denote substiuability while in a more than two input case at least one of them may denote
either substittability or complementarity.  Estimates  of partial elasticities  of substitution rv  can be
obtained  directly  from the parameters  of the cost  function  as follows:- 57 -
Pfi  PXi  7 
o&5,  i-3  ,  ,  t
The Hicks-Allen-Uzawa  partial elasticity  of substitution  (AES)  between  inputs i and j can be
written as:
cii  - C C * Cm  /Cj  'C1
where  C4 n  a
c-  =ac
and  Ci  =  2C
For the translog  oust  function  the  parameters yu  can be shown  to be related  to og  and the factor
shares  as fbilows:
Qi)  ag=  1, +  (y/SSS)  for all i  i = j
(ii)  o  =  (  + S+;2  - S)/S,2  fr  all i
The above elasticities  are not constrained  to be constant  as in the Cobb-Douglas  and the CES
finctions  but depend  on factor share  and input  coefficients.- 58  -
'asddes  of Faor  Denwud
The price  dasticIties  of input  demand  (ED)  both  respect  to own  and  other prices  are also derived
from the estimated  gamma coefficients. The concepts  of AES and ED are closely  related.  For the
translog  cost fraction  the input  demand  elasticities  are given  as follows:
S  =  Si au (cross-price  elasticity)
and
S,  = Si u, (own price elasticity)
The production  structure  specified  in equation  (1) and  (2) imposes  no a priori restrictions  on the
elasticities.
Enpirka  Eslmaion
The system  of equations  specified  in (I) and (2) was estimated  by a non-linear  iterative  system
method  using Gauss-Newton  Algorithm. The system  converged  in ten iterations  with a criteria  of .01.
Parameter  estimates  are presented  in table 1. Asymptotic  t-statistics  reported  in the same  table imply  that
most of the coefficients  are significant. In particular,  coefficients  of most interest  to us in this study
nameiy yRV, 'YQR  afdlCl are significant  at the  .05 level.
The parameter  estimates  presented  in Table 1 enable  us to calculate  both partial and total own
price elasticity of demand.  The partial own price elasticity of factor demand is given by:
Cil  '  °,i  S,  X  (Yli  +  S,2  - SI)ISI2- 59 -
Table  1:  Fstlmadon  Results
arametr  Estimate  t-statistic
aQ  1.71B  12.4
IYQQ  -0.08  -4.5
748  0.015  1.93
IYQM  +0.00714  2.7
YQ,  -0.01415  -1.4
TQR  -0.00349  -11.2
IYQL  -0.00448  -0.8
0a3  -0.285  -4.2
aIM  -0.135  -5.9
al  1.122  13.2
GfR  0.0367  12.5
(ZL  0.2618  5.3
,YuS  -0.062  -7.4
Att.gis  -0.001  -0.45
AtR  -0.075  -5.3
'YRR  0.00062763  5.1
,U.  -0.0010206  -3.0
IYSM  -0.002069  -0.5
A>=  0.065  6.96
'YSR  0.0012  5.1
IYSL  -0.00C04  -3.0
,Yha  0.00389  0.6
-- BMR  0.00126  5.  1
IYNL  -0.00204  -3.0
73m  -0.001097  -1.96
ln.  0.00714  3.0
YR;.  -0.00204  -3.0
X,  0.0330  2.7
on  -0.0014  -3.4
*1s  0.00647  2.5
0.000602  0.2
0.0121  4.3
XOtR  0.000108  0.24
Oa.  0.019  -8.97
rb,4  -0.00645  -0.438
cEo  -3.6  -6.6
log of Likelihoed  Function  =  3410.9-60 -
For  R&D  capital,  partial  own  price  elasticity  of  demand  can  be  written
as:  - kCP'  (y 6 '  +  R  R) IS R 2
By substitting numerical  values  for the parameter,
-0. 6034
The total own  price elasticity  of R&D  capital,  on the other hand, is given  by:
Elm  X  +  XR  R  E  + NR 
5 * SR =  -O.1615
To obtain  the impact  of changes  in tax credits  on additional  R&D expendittres,  we also need  to
develop  an estimate  of the elasticity  of the user cost  of R&D capital  with respect  to the credit  rate. This
can be obtained  from the expression  for the user cost of R&D capital given in Appendix  A (data
appendix)  as follows:
V  R  (P  +  .&)  (1-u,)  WV =  (say)
By substituting  parameter  values  and the sample  mean  values  in the above  expression  we obtain
0  =  4.49248
Now additional  R&D expenditures  can be obtained  by multiplying  the R&D capital  stock  by4
and Cm. Total  R&D capital  stock  for 1983  is estimated  to be 10 billion  dollars. Thus
Additional  R&D Expenditures  =  10 X (-0.16150  9-0.49248)
=  0.7959 billion
=  $795 million4, 
-61  -
The total cost  of R&D tax credits  ($194 million)  and R&D allowances  ($247 million)  in 1983
was  $441  million. Tbus additional  R&D  expenditures  per dollar  cost  would  be$L80 (795/441  = $1.80).
This suggess  that R&D tax credits had a significant  positive impact on R&D investmnent  in Canada and
for  every dollar of revenue foregone  by the national  treasury $1.80 worth of additional  R&D investment
was  undertaken.  Thus  R&D  tax credit  is a cost-effective  instrument  for the  promotion  of R&D  in Canada.62- 
S. SUAMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
This concluding  section  brings  together  conclusions  of earlier  sections  in summary  form. In the
following,  main  themes  emerging  from an analysis  of R&D  and production  structure,  R&D  and product
market structure,  rationale  for public intervention  for R&D investment  and the effectiveness  of tax
policies  for R&D investment  are presented.
R&D Cka  l and she  Stscun  of Production
R&D capital, as an input, includes scientific and engineering  personnel, laboratories  and
equipment  and related  inputs. R&D capital  serves  as an input  in a joint production  of multiple  outputs
which  include  product  and process  development.  R&D  capital  facilitates  the mapping  of technological
possibilities  into economic  opportunities.
R&D tkes  time to accumulate  and uses up scarce resources. It may take several  years for a
project  to proceed  from  proposal  to development  stage. R&D capital  accumulation  serves  to create  new
knowledge  relating  to new production  techniques. Thus it ensures  that the process  of technical  change
is evolutionary  and cumulative  in character. Technological  change  widens  production  opportmities  for
the economy  by enabling  it to obtain  greater  outputs  with given  inputs  or the substitution  of relatively
cheaper  inputs  for relatively  more expensive  ones.
A special  feature  of R&D capital  is the imperfect  appropriability  of returns as a result  of intra-
as well as inter-industry  capital  spillovers- Spillovers  diffiuse  knowledge  by channels  such as patents,
cross-licensing  agreements,  R&D personnel  mobility  and input  purchases. The overall  impact  of R&D
capital  spillovers  on the incentives  to undertake  additional  R&D investment  is unclear  in view of two
opposing  influences. First, the imperfect  appropriability  of returns  from own  R&D has a disincentive
effect. Second,  the desire  to tap into  the external  knowledge  and  associated  benefits  promotes  incentives-63 -
to undertake  own R&D  to develop  an internal  capability  to benefit  from externally  generated  knowledge.
The net impact  of the above  varies  by industry  and explains  the paradox  posed  by some  R&D intensive
industries  such as electronics  and chemicals  where  the high levels  of spillovers  do not seem  to have  any
detrimental  effects  on the incentives  to undertake  additional  R&D investment.
The following  broad conclusions  emerge from a survey of the available  empirical  evidence
relating  R&D capital  ad  the structure  of production.
*  The overall adjustment  process from R&D project initiation to  product and process
development  takes three  to five years.
*  The marginal  adjustment  costs for R&D are higher  than  those  for plant and equipment.
*  The own  price  elasticity  of demand  for R&D  capital  is less  than  unity  regardless  of the  time
period considered.
*  R&D capital  is a complement  to physical  capital  but a substitute  for labor in the long  run.
*  The long run output elasticity  of demand  for R&D capital is close to unity.  Short run
elasticities  are much  smaller  than  those  for the long run.
*  U.S. subsidiaries  in Canada and Canadian-controlled  private corporations  show similar
response  in the long  run but  the short  run impact  of output  changes  on R&D  capital  is more
pronounced  for the latter.
*  Output  changes  exert a much  stronger  influence  on R&D capital  than  vice versa.
*  The contribution  of R&D  capital  to the productivity  growth  is inconclusive  but more  recent
work  confirms  U.S. findings  of a positive  and significant  relationship.
*  R&D capital  spillovers  are large  and significant  and as a result  the social  rate of returns  on
R&D projects exceeds  the private returns by at least two-thirds  of the private return in
Canada.-64  -
R&D Cqpit  and Produd Mar*et  Stiacture
The value of cost reducing  R&D is detennined  by its profitability. Since  private  returns from
R&D  understate  true social  returns  from such investments,  R&D will be underprovided.  Furthermore,
since  R&D investments  often  represent  large fixed costs, market  structure  in R&D intensive  industries
is going  to be concentrated.  The  above  situation  is, however,  not unique  to R&D. What is unique  about
the R&D is the nature of spillovers. These spillovers  reduce industry  costs but since they result in
inappropriability  of returns for the R&D performer, incentives  to do R&D are reduced.  Restoring
appropriability  does  not  help  matters  either  because  it results  in industrial  concentration,  incorrect  pricing
of R&D  and  resulting  social  costs. Perfect  appropriability  may  also result  in excessive  R&D  because  too
many  firms  may be fishing  for the same  information.'
The information  asynunetry  between a R&D performer and a financier distinguishes  R&D
investment  from traditional  risky investment. It is in the interest  of the R&D performer  to keep vital
project information  secret but in the absence of detailed information,  project financing  may not be
forthcoming.  Asymmetric  information  also limits  the R&D firm's ability  to profit  from its output.
The following  broad  conclusions  emerge  from a survey  of empirical  evidence  on the re'l4ionsbip
between  R&D capital  and market  structure.
*  Success breeds success.  Since learning involves costs, successful  firms possess an
advantage  over their rivals in enjoying  greater possibilities  for further success.  Thus
monopoly  persists  in the R&D capital  market. Past successes  of R&D investments  lead  to
greater  current  R&D  efforts  on the part of the successful  firms. These  firms,  thereby,  tend
to produce  firther innovations  and thus  widen  the gap  between  themselves  and  their rivals.
*  The relationship  between  R&D  and firn size is much  looser  and obscure  than is implied  by
the usual statements  of Schumpeterian  hypothesis. While much of the R&D capital is
concentrated  in large firms, it is more  likely  that  they have become  large because  of theirlarge.
*  R&D capital  and industrial  concentration  are positively  correlated  up to moderate  levels  of
industrial  concentration.
*  Intra-industry  spillovers  drive a wedge  between  the social and the private return in an
industry  as well  as between  the social  rates  across  industries.  Social  rates  of return  diverge
from the private  rates  by 50 to 150 percent  depending  upon  the R&D intensiveness  of tte
industry.
*  In the presence  of spillovers,  the seciety's  demand  for R&D capital  at the existing  market
rates of return  significantly  exceeds  the private  demand.
Publc  Poly  and R&D Investment
It has been argued  that social  rate of return from R&D is higher  than the private  rate of return
due either  to the presence  of spillovers  or information  asymmetries.  Due to the  presence  of spillover,  the
R&D performer  is not able to fully appropriate  benefits  associated  with his activity.  The presence  of
asymmetric  information  between  R&D  performer  and  financier  limits  financing  of R&D  projects.  Project
success  warrants  secrecy  but project financing  requires  release  of vital inforrnation.  As a result many
projects  lapse, lacking  financing.  The asymmetric  information  in the R&D  output  market  also  limits  the
R&D firm's ability  to achieve  licensing  gains  from trade.
Most industrial  nations see the need to intervene  through  the tax code to encourage  R&D
activities.  Empirical  evidence  on the effectiveness  of such  initiatives  is quite  limited.  This  study  examined
the impact  of Canadian  R&D  tax credit  on R&D  investment  using  a production  structure  framework.  This
framework  enables  a researcher  to trace  the impact  of tax policies  on production  and  investment  decisions
of an industry.  An implementation  of this  framework  was carried  out  by using  detailed  data  on inputs  and-66 -
otusand  factor and output  prices and tax regime  for 18 Canadian  industries  for the period 1963  to
1983. Provisions  in the tax cods wee used to develop  estimates  for the user cost of capita.  A system
of simulutaneus  eqations  incorporating  the cost function  and derived input demand fuinctions  was
estimated  using  non-linear  interactive  methods  in translog  form.  The estimated  cost  function  fitted  the data
well and  also was well-behaved'.  An analysis  of parameter  estimates  for this cost  function  suggests  that
R&D tax credit  had a significant  positive  impact  on R&D investment  in Canada  and for every  dollar of
revenue  foregone  by the national  treasury  $1.80 worth  of additional  R&D investment  was undertaken.
This  suggests  that  a properly  designed  tax incentive  can  further  public  policy  objectives  in a cost-effective
manner.- 67 -
NOTES
1. Conventionally  defined,  knowledge  capital  or R&D  capital  inputs  primarily  refer  to an aggregation  of
scientists, engineers, other R&D personnel, laboratories  and  associated equipment and related
expenditures  into a single  or a few broad  categories. See  Bernstein  (1986),  Bernstein  and Nadiri  (1984),
Griliches  (1979)  and Mansfield  (1968). Following  Mansfield  (1968), "research"  in this paper refers  to
original  investigations  directed  to the discovery  of new scientific  knowledge,  and "development'  entails
all technical  activities  geared  to translating  research  findings  into products  and processes. Mansfield
(1968)  also argued  that  the amount  of R&D capital  in a particular  industry  depends  upon the resources
devoted by firms, independent  investors and governments  to  the improvement  of  the industry's
technology.
2. See Bernstein  (1986c),  pp. 2-5.
3. Mohnen  et. al. (1986)  found  that  the  rates  of return  (net  of depreciation  and  adjustment  costs)  for R&D
capital were higher than those for the physical  capital  and that these rates were higher for Japanese
industries  than  those  for U.S. and West  Germany. One  structural  explanation  concerns  the financing  of
R&D. In 1975, only 1.7 percent  of gross  expenditures  on R&D  performed  by the manufacturing  sector
were funded  by government  in Japan  compared  to 13.5  percent  in Germany  and 35.4  percent  in the U.S.
The authors contend  that the absence  of adequate  government  support  may be a motivating  factor for
Japanese  managers  to direct  their  R&D efforts  to more  profitable  projects. See Mohnen  et. al. (1986,
p. 765.
4. Similar  results  were found  by Lichtenberg  and Siegel  (1991)  for a more  recent  sample.
5. See Bemstein  (1985),  pp. 25-26 for further  insights  in R&D spillover  mechanisms.
6. See also Nelson  (1982).
7. Nelson  (1982)  notes  that even  rival firms  make "logy" (theory  as opposed  to technique  which  refers
to a way  of doing  something)  public  although  the technique  is kept  private. This  practice  serves  to reduce
the deadweight  loss associated  with keeping  R&D efforts  completely  secret.
8. First version  August  1986;  final  version  accepted  November  1988.
9. First version 1987;  final  version  accepted  May 1988.
10. Value in 1987  dollars.
11. See Nelson  and Winter  (1982),  pp. 130-131.
12. See Kamien  and Schwartz  (1975),  pp. 16-18  and also Kamien  and Schwartz  (1982),  pp. 75-84.
13. See Kamien  and Schwartz  (1975),  pp. 8-11  and Dasgupta  (1982),  p. 8.
14. See Scherer  (1967b).68  -
15. See Mansfield  (1968a),  Scherer (1965b),  Freeman  (1971), Johannison  and Lindstrom  (1971)  and
Schwartman(1976).  Following Mansfield (1968), "research" in  this  paper refers to  original
investigations  directed to the discovery  of new scientific  knowledge,  and "development"  entails all
technical  activities  geared  to translating  research  findings  into products.
16. See Levin (1986.  A recent  example  of inventing  around is Eastman  Xodak's instant  cameras. A
superior  court recently  ruled that these infringed  on the patent rights of Polaroid Corporation. See
Mansfield,  Rapoport,  Romeo,  Wagner  and  Beardsley  for a tiorough discussion  of this  topic  and empirical
estimates.
17. See also Spence  (1984)  for a fornal treatment  of this problem.
18. This section is based on Congressional  Budget  Office (1985), pp. 19-29 and Kaplan, Ijiri and
Visscher  (1982).
19. This section  draws  heavily  from Bernstein  (1986).
20. See Scherer  (1967b).69 -
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Appeidix A:  7IE DATA
Most  of the data  used in this study  is drawn  from the Economic  Council  of Canada  data bank for
the Candide  Model  and covers  the period 1963  to 1983. Three digit level of aggregation  is used for a
sample  of i8 industries. The following  industry  aggregates  are included  in our sample.
1.  Communications  & Transportation
2.  Crude  Petrolmm
3.  Miming
4.  Utilities
5.  Furniture  and Fixtures
6.  Iron and Steel
7.  Non-Ferrous  Metals
S.  Metal Fabricating
9.  Machinery  Except  Electical Machinery
10. Non-Auto  Transport  Equipment
11. Motor  Vehicles  Except  Parts and Accessories
12. Electrical  Products
13. Non-Metallic  Mining  Products
14. Food and  Beverages
15. Rubber  and Plastics
16. Textiles
17. Petroleum  and Coal  Products
18. Chemical  and Chemical  Products- 80 -
The following  series  were  obtained  either  from  the CANDIDE  Model  3.0 data  bank  or from  other
sources in the Economic  Council of Canada.
Gross  output  in current  dollars:
Gross  output  in constant  (1971)  dollars:
Manhours:  These  series  were  developed  by Rao  and  the  details  of construction  are given  in Ostry
and  Rao (1980,  pp.59-62).
Wages:
Capital Stock - Structures:
User  Cost  of Structures:  Estimates  are  from  Lodh  (1984)  using  a modified  Hall-Jorgenson  (1967)
approach  to take into account  sector  specific  depreciation  rates,  tax parameters,  and debt  equity  ratios.
Capital Stock - Machinery  and Equipment:
User Cost  of Machinery  and Equipment:  Estimates  are from Lodh  (1984).
Intermediate  inputs  in curent dollars:
Intermediate  inputs  in constant  (1971)  dollars:
Energy  consumption  in current  dollars:
Energy  Price Indices:  The data are from Rao  and Preston  (1983).
In addition,  the data  was also collected  or esimated  for the following  series:
R&D Price Indexes:  Precious  studies  on the subject  have invariably  used the GNE implicit
deflator,  the GNE implicit  price index  for machinery  and equipment  or the Consumer  Price Index  to
deflate  R&D expenditures. The GNE deflator  or the CPI are inappropriate  deflat-ors  for the R&D
expenditures  because  they  relate  to output  measures  of economic  activity  whereas  R&D  serves  as an input
in the production  process. The GNE  implicit  price index  is also  inappropriate  as a deflator  because  more
tham  80  percent  of R&D  expenditures  represent  operating  as upposed  to capital  expenditures-  Fortunately,- 81 -
Bernstein  (1986b)  has developed  price indexes  for Canadian  Industrial  R&D expenditures.  These  series
were used in this study.
R&D Tax Credits,  R&D Allowances  and R&D  Expenditures:  These  series  were compiled  from
various  releases  of the Statistics  Canada  and from unpublished  data files of Statistics  Canada.
R&D Capital  Stock: These  data series  were  constructed  using  a perpetual  inventory  method  (see
Mohnen  et al. 1986). The  benchmark  data is obtained  from the first  period  R&D expenditure  as follows:
Period 1:
R&D Expenditure  (1)/Price  Index  (1) = R&D  Investment  (1)
R&D Capital (1) =  Public Investment (1)/(n + 6)
where  n = rate of growth  of real output
6 = depreciation  rate
Period 2:
R&D Capital  Stock  (2) = R&D  Expenditure  (2)/R&D  Price Index  (2)
+  (1 - 6) R&D Capital (1)
and so on.
User Cost  of R&D Capital: It was estimated  using  the following  formula  (see Bernstein  1986c):
where  P  =  acquisition  price of R&D capital
p  =  discount rate
d2  =  depreciation  rate
u,  =  Income  tax rate
=  effective credit rate
d4  =  present  value of incremental  allowances  for R&D expenditures.- 82 -
Total  Cost: The total cost of output  was estimated  by applying  input  prices (user costs)  to input
quantities. For this purpose, five inputs  are considered,  namely,  structure  capital,  machinery  capital,
R&D capital, intermediate  inputs  and labor.-83  -
Appendix B: financIal Assistance  for Research  and  Development  in Canada
The following  federal programs are currently available  in Canada for the support of R&D
activities:
1.  Industrial  and Regional  Development  Program (IRDP).  This program provides grant
Mnd/or  loan  support  to a wide  variety  of projects. 1984185  cost  of the  program  was  $110.2
million.
2.  Industria Research Assistance  Programn  (IRAP).  Thbis  program provides support for
applied  industrial  research. 1984/85  cost was $48  million.
3.  Defense  Industry  Productivity  Program (DIPP). Marching  grants/loans  are available  to
defense contractors  and subcontractors  through  this program.  1984/85  cost was $131
million.
4.  Program  for Industry/Laboratory  Projects  (PILP). This program  provides  financing  for
industrial  applications  of R&D output  of public  agencies. 1984/85  cost was $29 million.
S.  Scientific and Technical Information.  Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical
Information  and  National  Research  Council  provide  such  information  to business  at minimal
or no cost
6.  Training Assistance. Funding for training is provided through three major programs; Skills
Growth  Fund, National  Institutional  Training  Progrmn  and  the National  Industrial  Training
Program  (NITP). 1984/85  cost was $294  million.
7.  Technology  support  Trough Procurement.  1984/85  cost of this  program  was  $261million.
S.  Techology Support  Through  Institutes: About  $5 million  in annual  support  for industrial
research  centers  is provided  through  this programn.
9.  Departmental  Programs: Several federal  departments  have programs  designed  io assist
technology  development  in specific  industries  or areas.  1984/85  cost was $72 million.- 84  -
10.  Patents  Support
11.  Public Awareness  of Science  and  Technology: 1984/85  cost was $1.5 million.
12.  Support  for Universitylhidustry  Cooperative  Programs: 1983/84  cost of  this program  was
$36  million.
Under a new program  armounced  in July 1986, the federal  government  undertook  to match dollar for
dollar the private  sector contributions  to University  research.- 85-
Appendix C:  Deflnitlon of Scientific Research and Experimental  Development
Regulation  2900  of the Income  Tax Act  (section  37) defined  'scientific  researcb  and experimental
development"  (SRED) as a  "systematic  investigation  or search carried out in a field of science or
technology  by means of experiment  or analysis". The technology  was defined  as a systematic  study of
the application  of scientific  knowledge  to industrial  processes  or product  development
"(a)  basic research, namely work undertaken  for the advancement  of scientific  knowledge
without  a specific  practical  application  in view,
(b)  applied  research,  namely  work undertaken  for the advancement  of scientific  knowledge
with a specific  practical  application  in view, or
(c)  development,  namely  use of the results of basic or applied  research for the purpose  of
creating  new, or improving  existing  materials,  devices,  products  or processes."
Activities  in engineering  or design,  operations  research,  mathematical  analysis  or computer  programming
and  psychological  research  are eligible  only if such activities  are undertaken  directly  in support  of basic
or applied  research  or eligib!e  development  activities.
The following  activities  are excluded  from SRED.
*  market  research  and sales  promotion;
*  quality  control  or routine  testing  of materials,  devices  oL  products;
*  research in the social  sciences  or the humanities;
*  prospecting,  exploring  or drilling  for or producing  minerals,  petroleum  or natural  gas;
*  the commercial  production  of a new or improved  material, device or product or the
commercial  use of a new or improved  process;
*  style changes;
*  routine  data collection.
Revenue  Canada  circular  86-4  provides  a det4fl§l  interpretation  of section  37 and regulation  2900  of the
Income  Tax Act relating  to tax provisilS for sciee*fic  research  and  development.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS130B Capital  Flows  and Long-Term  Ibrahim  A. Elbadawl  June 1994  A. Martin
Equilbrlum Rea!  Exchange  Rates  Raimundo  Solo  39065
In  ChUe
WPS1307 How Taxation  Affects Foreign  Direct  Joosung Jun  June 1994  S. King-Watson
Investment  (Country Specilflc  Evidence)  31047
WPS1308 Ownership  a.d Corporate  Control  In  Brian  Pinto  June 1994  M. Kam-Cheong
Poland:  Why State Firms  Defied  the  Sweder  van Wljnbergen  39618
Odds
WPS1309 Is Demand  for Polluling  Goods  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  June 1994  C. Jones
Manageable?  An Econometric  Study  Tarhan N. Feyzioglu  37699
of  Car Ownership  and Use  in Mexico
WPS1310 China's Economic  Reformns:  Pointers  Justin Yifu Lin  June 1994  C. Spooner
for Other Eoonomies  in Transition  Fang  Cal  30464
Thou U
WPS1311 The  Supply Response  to Exchange  Mustapha  Rouls  June 1994  J. Schwartz
Rate Reform  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  Weshah Razzak  32250
(Empirical  Evidence)  Carios  Molinedo
WPS1312 The New Wave  of Private  Capital  Eduardo  Femandez-Arias  June 1994  R. Tutt
Inflows:  Push or Pull?  31047
WPS1313 New Estimates  of Total  Factor  Vikram Nehru  June 1994  M. Coleridge-
Productivity  Growth  for Developing  Ashok Dhareshwar  Taylor
and Industrial  Countries  33704
WPS1314 The Significance  of the  Europe  Bardomiej  Kaminski  June 1994  M. Patenla
Agreements for Central  European  37947
Industrial Exports
WPS1315 Global  Tradable  Carbon  Permits.  Bjom Larsen  June 1994  C. Jones
Participalion  Incentives,  and  Anwar  Shah  37754
Transfers
WPS1316 Presenting  the CFA Zone:  Macroeco- Shantayanan  Devarajan  June 1994  C. Jones
no4nc  Coordination  After the  Michael  Walton  37699
Devaluaton
WPS1317 Estimating  the Effciency Gains  Jeremy  Bulow  July 1994  R. Vo
of Debt Restructuring  Kenneth  Rogoff  33722
Ning  S. Zhu
WPS1318 Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  Miguel  A. Kiguel  July 1994  M. Divino
in Argentina  and Chile:  A Fresh Look  Nissan Lviatan  33739Policy Research  Working Paper S.rle.
Contact
Titie  Author  Data  for paper
WP51319  The  Financial  System  and  Public  Asli  DemIhg)g~-Kunt  July  1994  S. Moore
Enterprise  Reformn:  Concepts  and  Ross  Levine  35261
Cases
WPSIS20  Capital  Structures  In Developing  Asil  Demirg0;-Kunt  July  1994  B.  Moore
Countries:  Evidence  from'Ten  Vojisiav  Makslmovic  35261
Countries
WP81321  Institutions  and  the East  Asian  Jose  Edgardo  Campos  July  1994  B.  Moore
Miracle:  Asymnmetric  Informiation,  Donald  Uen  35261
Rent-Seeking,  and  the  Delibramtion
Councii
WPS1322  Reducing  Regulatory  Barrir  to  Barbara  Richard  July  1994  M.  Dhokal
Private-Sector  Participation  In Latin  Thelmna  Trlche  33970
America's  Water  and  Sanitation  Services
WPS1323  Energy  Pridcng  and  Air  Polluion:  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  July 1994  C. Jones
Economtric  Evidence  from  Emmanuel  Jimenez  37699
Manufacturing  In  Chile  and  Indonesia  Uli Uu
WPS1324  Voucher  Funds  in Transtional  Robert  E.  Anderson  July 1994  F.  Hatab
Economies:  The  Czech  and  Slovak  35835
Experience
WPS1325  The  Economics  of  Research  and  AnwarbShah  July  1994  C. Jones
Development  How  Research  and  37899
Developn,ont1.  Capital  Affects  Production
and  Markets  and  Is Affected  by  Tax
Incentives
WPS1326  Banks,  Capial  Markets,  and  Gerhard  Pohl  July  1994  L. Hovsepian
Corporate  Goverance:  Lessons  Stijn  Claessens  37297
from Russia  for Easter  Europe
WPS1327 Is  the Debt  Crisis  History?  Recent  Michael  Dooley  July 1994  S. King-Watson
Private  Capital  infows  to Developing Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias  31047
Countries  Kenneth  Kietzer
WPS1328  The  Use  of New  York  Cotton  Futures  Panos  Varangis  July  1994  D. Gustafson
Contracts  to Hedge  Cotton  Price  Risk Elton  Thigpen  33714
in Developing  Countries  Sudhakar  Satyanarayan